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The Detention Power
Stephen I. Vladeckt
It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we would
sanction the subversion of one of those liberties ... which makes the
defense of the Nation worthwhile.'
INTRODUCTION
Concerns over the proper separation of powers-the delicate interplay
between the roles and responsibilities of the three branches of government-
have inundated the legal landscape in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of
2September 11, 2001, and rightly so. Never is the correct balance of competing
governmental interests more imperiled than during times of trouble,3 and there
is little doubt that, more formal legal terminology aside, the past couple of
years have been just that.4
That the Constitution confers considerable power upon the government to
take decisive action during such troubled times is, by now, a foregone
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Hurwitz, Jenny Martinez, Elisa Massimino, and the entire student cast of the Balancing Civil Liberties
& National Security Post-9/11 Project at Yale, especially Chad Golder, Emma Quinn-Judge, Heidee
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1. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967).
2. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 351, 356 (4th Cir. 2003) (Traxler, J., concurring
with denial of rehearing en banc), petition for cert. filed, No. 03-6696 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2003); United States
v. Moussaoui, 336 F.3d 279, 284-86 (4th Cir. 2003) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc); Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 951-52 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(Tatel, J., dissenting), petition for cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3248 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2003) (No. 03-472).
3. See generally EDWARD S. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 35-77 (1947)
(describing the effects of total wars on domestic governments); CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL
DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES 209-87 (Transaction Publishers 2002)
(1948) (surveying how separation of powers concerns are at their most poignant during times of crisis);
Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. (forthcoming Mar. 2004) (surveying the
competing interests and proposing a legislative solution); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should
Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1134 (2003) ("Acute
national emergencies are a test of faith-faith in ourselves, in our ability to cope and emerge victorious
in the face of adversity, and in principles that we hold to be 'fundamental."').
4. See Diane P. Wood, The Rule of Law in Times of Stress, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 455 (2003). Much
has been made of the question of whether the "war on terror" constitutes a "war," "emergency," or other
"crisis" for constitutional purposes. See, e.g., Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and
the Ambiguous War on Terrorism, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 345, 346-50 (2002); Derek Jinks, September 11
and the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2003); David Meltzer, Al Qa 'ida: Terrorists or Irregulars?,
in LAW AFTER GROUND ZERO 71 (John Strawson ed., 2002). The answer, however, is mostly immaterial
to the analysis herein, thus this Note largely neglects this immensely important question.
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conclusion and an unquestionable fact.5 One of these powers is what might be
called the "detention" power-the authority to incarcerate or otherwise restrain
individuals without a preexisting statutory basis--e.g., criminal laws or civil
6
commitment statutes. This detention power is of enormous significance, for it
allows the government to deprive individuals of their most sacred liberty-their
freedom-without affording what we have come to think of as "normal"
procedural protections or judicial review. On its face, invocation of the
detention power is tantamount to an assertion that the exigency of the situation
justifies the abrogation of due process.
In the aftermath of September 11, the Bush Administration has advanced
just such a claim-that the exigency justifies the detention7-in its military
confinement of hundreds of "enemy combatants," 8 including, as of fall 2003,
two U.S. citizens held at Navy brigs within the United States, one non-citizen
also detained at a South Carolina Navy Brig, and hundreds of non-citizens
detained at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba. Invoking "the
president's ... commander-in-chief responsibilities under the Constitution" as
"[t]he president's authority to detain enemy combatants, including U.S.
citizens, ' 9  the Administration has held these "enemy combatants"
incommunicado, without charges, without counsel, and without due process,
for, in most cases, well over two years.'o
5. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1963). See generally DANIEL
FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION 176-200 (2002) (making this point in the context of the Civil War).
6. I should be clear, from the outset, that by the "detention" power, I do not mean the actual
authority to detain individuals initially, be they combatants on the battlefield or suspected terrorists
within the United States. The detention power that this Note is concerned with is the power to detain
beyond those periods normally allowed by the Constitution, other statutes, or international law. See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. §§ 3161, 3164 (2000) (mandating, as part of the Speedy Trial Act, time limits on detention
without charges in the federal criminal system). For lawful combatants whose belligerency is not in
doubt, international law generally allows their detention as prisoners of war until the end of hostilities.
See infra Section II.B (discussing the authority to detain enemy citizen prisoners of war).
7. The exigency of the "war on terror" has been invoked as the grounds for a whole host of policy
changes. For detailed accountings of these, see FIONA DOHERTY ET AL., LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL: LIBERTY AND SECURITY FOR THE POST-SEPTEMBER I I UNITED
STATES (2003), http://www.Ichr.org/pubs/descriptions/Assessing/AssessingtheNewNormal.pdf.
8. A separate issue in these cases, as we will see, is the extent to which "enemy combatant" is a
term with its own dubious meaning. See infra note 92; see also infra text accompanying note 190.
9. Oversight of the Department of Justice: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
107th Cong., 2002 WL 1722725 (2002) (testimony of Att'y Gen. John Ashcroft).
10. Whereas the detentions received little initial attention from the academy, many recent works,
mostly student-written, have focused on specific aspects of the two cases. See, e.g., Jordan Paust,
Judicial Power To Determine the Status and Rights of Persons Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 503 (2003); Irma Alicia Cabrera Ramirez, Comment, Unequal Treatment of United States Citizens:
Eroding the Constitutional Safeguards, 33 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 207 (2003); Nickolas A.
Kacprowski, Note, Stacking the Deck Against Suspected Terrorists: The Dwindling Procedural Limits
on the Government's Power To Indefinitely Detain United States Citizens as Enemy Combatants, 26
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 651 (2003); Thomas J. Lepri, Note, Safeguarding the Enemy Within: The Need for
Procedural Protections for U.S. Citizens Detained as Enemy Combatants Under Ex parte Quirin, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 2565 (2003); Samantha A. Pitts-Kiefer, Note, Jose Padilla: Enemy Combatant or
Common Criminal?, 48 VILL. L. REv. 875 (2003); Alejandra Rodriguez, Comment, Is the War on
Terrorism Compromising Civil Liberties? A Discussion of Hamdi and Padilla, 39 CAL. W. L. REV. 379
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This Note argues that such an inherent, constitutional executive detention
power, particularly as invoked against U.S. citizens," simply does not exist.
Rather, even in emergencies, the various forms of the detention power-
irrespective of the detaining authority-have always belonged to Congress, to
delegate or to restrain as it sees fit. To support this claim, this Note constructs a
historical narrative of the detention power in the United States, beginning with
the Founding, and the various forms the detention power takes, or may be
argued to take, in the Constitution. As the narrative demonstrates, from the
earliest moments of the Republic, it was understood that the power to authorize
detentions, even during wartime, was a power emphatically vested in Congress,
not the President. The actual act of detention was the responsibility of the
executive branch, but only when Congress had, in some form, previously
authorized the detention itself. Up until the Civil War, the debate centered on
the Suspension Clause of the Constitution, which precludes suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus "unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public
safety may require it,'2 whereas, during World War II, the power took several
different forms. Most notorious was the internment of tens of thousands of
Americans of Japanese descent, but equally important were the detention and
trial of Nazi saboteurs (including two U.S. citizens), the imposition of martial
law in Hawaii, and the confinement of U.S. citizen enemy prisoners of war.
As I argue, one of the heretofore overlooked common threads underlying
(2003); Amanda Schaffer, Comment, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Terrorists: An In-Depth Analysis
of the Government's Right To Classify United States Citizens Suspected of Terrorism as Enemy
Combatants and Try Those Enemy Combatants by Military Commission, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1465
(2003); Stephen I. Vladeck, Policy Comment, A Small Problem of Precedent: 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) and
the Detention of U.S. Citizen "Enemy Combatants," 112 YALE L.J. 961 (2003). For an early summary of
some of the post-September 11 detention issues, see Whitney D. Frazier, Note, The Constitutionality of
Detainment in the Wake of September 11th, 90 KY. L.J. 1089 (2001-2002).
11. Though there is certainly no moral imperative that requires such a distinction based on
citizenship, there are significant statutory and constitutional differences between the government's
power as to the detention of its own citizens and its power to detain non-citizens, especially those
outside the territorial United States. Even within the United States, the Alien Enemy Act of 1798, 50
U.S.C. §§ 21-24, allows the President to deport alien enemies during wartime without due process or
judicial review. See infra note 40 (discussing the Alien Enemy Act). Further, non-citizens identified as
terrorists may be detained for a short period-no more than seven days-without charges under certain,
statutorily-prescribed conditions. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 412, 115 Stat. 272, 350-52 (codified at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226a (West 2003)); see also Shirin Samar, Note,
Patriotic or Unconstitutional? The Mandatory Detention of Aliens Under the USA Patriot Act, 55 STAN
L. REV. 1419 (2003) (providing an overview and an assessment of the mandatory detention provisions).
See generally DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN
THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003) (surveying the non-citizen issues).
Because of these fundamental differences, this Note focuses on the detention power as it applies to
the detention of U.S. citizens only, though many of the conclusions can be juxtaposed onto the cases of
the Guantdnamo detainees. Thus far, however, each habeas petition filed on their behalf has been
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. See, e.g., Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir.
2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343). The case of Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-
Mari, the non-citizen detained in South Carolina, raises many of the same policy issues, even if the
legal issues are distinct. See Al-Marri v. Bush, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (C.D. Ill. 2003).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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all of these various categories of detention was the role, in each case, of
Congress. Courts may have historically looked to the legislature as an
afterthought, desperate to somehow justify their wartime deference to the
executive, but it is immensely significant that they looked in that direction at
all, rather than deferring, as they easily could have, to a broad conception of
unilateral executive power. A proper understanding of this historical
relationship further helps to understand the importance of the Emergency
Detention Act of 1950, its repeal in 1971, and the contemporaneous
codification of 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), which mandates that "[n]o citizen shall be
imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an
Act of Congress."'1 3 As this Note argues, § 4001(a) marked a fundamental
turning point in the history of the detention power, for, to whatever extent the
constitutional role of Congress was implicitly mandated prior to 1971,
§ 4001(a) fundamentally and undeniably reaffirms the constitutional dynamic
envisioned by the Framers.
With that in mind, in Part IV, the Note turns to the present U.S. citizen
"enemy combatant" cases, Hamdi and Padilla. This Note is not primarily about
these two cases, nor does it attempt to be. 14 Even as it goes to press, further
proceedings are pending in each before the Supreme Court and the Second
Circuit, respectively. And yet, it would be impossible to understand the
importance of the argument set forth in Parts I, 1I, and III without
understanding the full scope of the claims advanced by the Bush
Administration in these instant cases.
Thus far, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (in Hamdi) and
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (in Padilla) have
upheld the facial legality of the detentions, and have focused much-if not
most-of their attention on other issues. In Hamdi, questions about the so-
called "battlefield" distinction dominate, along with concerns over the proper
evidentiary standard, whether Hamdi has actually admitted that he was
captured in a zone of active combat, who should have standing to press
Hamdi's claims in court, and so on.' 5 In Padilla, much of the legal wrangling
thus far has focused on procedural issues, including proper venue, jurisdiction,
and, most controversially, access to counsel.
16
13. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a).
14. My earlier piece on the subject focused more directly, albeit in a more limited fashion, on the
specific arguments at issue in those two cases, as do many of the other pieces thus far discussing either
case. See sources cited supra note 10.
15. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi IV), 337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed, No.
03-6696 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2003); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi II1), 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), rev'g 243
F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 2002); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi I), 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002); Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi 1), 294 F.3d 598 (4th Cir. 2002).
16. See Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld (Padilla 11), 243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush (Padilla 1), 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). After adhering to the
original opinion and order on reconsideration, Judge Mukasey certified Padilla for appeal to the Second
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Yet, underlying everything in these cases are two fundamental questions
that have been too quickly dismissed: Who has the power to authorize the
detention of these two U.S. citizens, and has that power been properly
exercised? Whether the detentions satisfy various constitutional
requirements-such as due process-are, at their core, questions of application.
Whether the detentions are constitutional on their face is a separate question
altogether, one that deserves more attention, and, indeed, one that should be
answered at the threshold. If there is no such thing as an executive
constitutional detention power, then the existence of unambiguous
congressional authorization is a manifest necessity. To satisfy this burden, the
government has invoked two different statutes, neither of which, as I show,
demonstrates congressional acquiescence in the detentions.
Instead, because of § 4001(a), Congress's failure to specifically invoke the
detention power to authorize the extra-judicial confinement of U.S. citizen
"enemy combatants" is tantamount to a rejection of the Bush Administration's
independent authority thereto. To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that there
is no constitutional detention power, and that § 4001(a) creates statutory
authority out of thin air. Instead, this Note seeks to demonstrate that the
Constitution clearly creates a detention power, but vests it in Congress, and that
no subsequent statutory or jurisprudential development casts this allocation in
any serious doubt. Indeed, what is at stake in these cases is not the interaction
between § 4001 (a) and the executive's constitutional authority, but rather the
executive's usurpation of an authority that has always belonged to Congress.
Though the executive is, and always has been, the detaining authority, the
detention power itself belongs to Congress, and to Congress alone.
Finally, in the Conclusion, I consider the proper place of the judiciary in
such troubled times. As Part IV demonstrates, the courts have thus far been
loath to interfere with the actions of the executive branch in conducting the so-
called "war on terror." Yet, is this the role that the courts are supposed to play?
Is this a role that we want them to play?
It is hard to overstate the significance of the issues implicated here, even if
some of the principals have urged the opposite.' 7 At stake are two of our most
basic constitutional precepts: the proper separation of powers between the
Circuit, Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld (Padilla II1), 256 F. Supp. 2d 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), where
oral arguments took place on November 17, 2003.
17. See, e.g., Padilla II, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 57 (Mukasey, C.J.) ("Those to whom images of
catastrophe come ... easily might take comfort in recalling that it is a year and a half since September
11, 2001, and Padilla's is not only the first, but also the only case of its kind. There is every reason not
only to hope, but also to expect that this case will be just another of the isolated cases, like Quirin, that
deal with isolated events and have limited application."). This statement is all the more ironic because it
is an expansive reading of Quirin that is one of the major issues in these cases. See infra Section IIA; cf
David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1, 28 (2003) ("Those who claim that the United States has avoided the mistakes of the past in its
current war on terrorism have failed to look beneath the surface.").
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executive and the legislature, and the individual right to not be deprived of
personal liberty without due process of law. Though much of the history this
Note traces tangentially implicates the latter, the underlying imperative is
undoubtedly the former-the importance of the proper separation of powers
after September 11. As James Madison warned,
No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the
authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty, than that... [t]he accumulation of
all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one,
a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.18
Obviously, the extra-judicial detention of two U.S. citizens does not a
tyrannical regime make, yet this does not mean that there is no cause for
concern. Though "[t]he world has changed since Sept[ember] 1 I,... the values
this country was founded on have not. Fear is no guide to the Constitution. We
must fight the enemies of freedom abroad without yielding to those at home."'
9
I. THE DETENTION POWER THROUGH THE CIVIL WAR
Without question, the Framers, in drafting the Constitution, clearly
provided the federal government with the power to detain its own citizens
without due process, without a right to counsel, and even without access to the
courts, in certain, limited times of national emergency. 20 As the primary
manifestation of this intent, the Suspension Clause of the Constitution,
conceived of as a defense against a tyrannical government, 21 explicitly
precludes suspension of the writ of habeas corpus "unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.' 22 When such
conditions existed, the writ could be suspended, but only when the Union was
in dire straits.23 Thus, the question that dominated the first century of detention-
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also Cable
from Winston Churchill to British Home Secretary Herbert Morrison (Nov. 21, 1943), quoted in A.W.
BRIAN SIMPSON, IN THE HIGHEST DEGREE ODIOUS: DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL IN WARTIME BRITAIN
391 (1992) ("The power of the Executive to cast a man into prison without formulating any charge
known to the law, and particularly to deny him the judgment of his peers, is in the highest degree odious
and is the foundation of all totalitarian government .... Nothing is more abhorrent than to imprison a
person or keep him in prison because he is unpopular. This is really the test of civilization.").
19. Editorial, The War on Civil Liberties, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2002, at A24; see also Cole, supra
note 17, at 30 ("Now more than ever it is critical that we remain true to our principles.... The success
of the war on terrorism, and indeed of our democratic experiment, requires us to reconsider the shortcuts
that we have all too swiftly and predictably adopted.").
20. See WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 127-33 (1980);
FARBER, supra note 5, at 160-61.
21. See ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 12-19
(2001) (discussing the origins of the Suspension Clause).
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. I should be clear that I do not mean to ground the detention power
solely in the Suspension Clause. If anything, the detention power is an amalgamation of various powers
delegated to Congress, and most of its forms do not require the suspension of habeas to withstand
constitutional scrutiny. My thanks to Professor Ingrid Wuerth for raising this important distinction.
23. Cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 650 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
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related jurisprudence was not whether such a power existed, but rather in which
branch such power was properly vested, even though the Suspension Clause is
part of Article I-those provisions pertaining to Congress.
24
A. The Suspension Clause and the Detention Power in the Early Republic
Neither Congress nor the courts had much of an opportunity, prior to the
onset of the U.S. Civil War, to speak to the nature of the detention power. Two
early cases, however, Ex parte Bollman25 and Brown v. United States,26 are
quite illustrative, as the Marshall Court twice affirmed the importance of
Congress in the detention scheme.
Bollman arose out of the fabled "Burr Conspiracy," when Vice President
Aaron Burr, at the end of President Thomas Jefferson's first term in office, left
the government and started an uprising in the western states and territories. 27 In
December 1806, James Wilkinson, the American military commander in New
Orleans, arrested Samuel Swartwout and Dr. Erick Bollman, two of Burr's
alleged co-conspirators. 28 Wilkinson subsequently ignored two writs of habeas
corpus, one from a territorial court in New Orleans and one from a federal
judge in Charleston, South Carolina, and transported the prisoners to
Washington to stand trial for treason. Eventually, after attempts to pass a bill
29
suspending the writ failed, the government applied to the D.C. circuit court
for an arrest warrant, to which a divided panel agreed.30 The prisoners in turn
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court, challenging
the legality of their arrest and confinement pending indictment.
Bollman, the first major Supreme Court decision to consider the
concurring) (seizing on the Suspension Clause as the only express constitutional grant of emergency
power to the executive). As one early member of Congress put it, suspension was meant to be limited to
"instances in which the judges themselves were a part of the rebellion." DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801-1829, at 132 (2001) (citing 16 ANNALS OF
CONG. 414 (1807) (statement of Rep. Nelson)).
24. The role of Congress was indeed explicit in early drafts of the provision. See Developments in
the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1264 (1970) ("[I]t is fairly clear that the
suspension clause itself was addressed exclusively to Congress: the original motion for a habeas clause
mentioned Congress expressly, as did some subsequent proposals; there is no indication in the debates
that the omission of reference to Congress in the clause finally adopted was intended to broaden its
applicability." (footnotes omitted)); see also DUKER, supra note 20, at 131-32.
25. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
26. 12U.S.(8Cranch) 110(1814).
27. See generally THOMAS PERKINS ABERNATHY, THE BURR CONSPIRACY (1954) (surveying the
history). President Jefferson had considered a partial suspension of the writ in some cases arising from
the incident, but, believing that only Congress could do so, he backed down when the House rejected a
suspension bill that had passed in the Senate. See Rex A. Collings, Jr., Habeas Corpus for Convicts-
Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace?, 40 CAL. L. REV. 335,340 (1952) (discussing the background
of the proposed Jefferson suspension); see also CURRIE, supra note 23, at 131-33 (same).
28. See Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus (pt. 1), 51 ALA. L. REV. 531, 559 (2000).
Indeed, Wilkinson "was himself heavily and discreditably involved in the alleged events." Id.
29. See id. at 559-61 (discussing the background); see also Collings, supra note 27, at 340.
30. See United States v. Bollman, 24 F. Cas. 1189 (C.C.D.D.C. 1807) (No. 14,822).
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constitutional dynamic of the writ of habeas corpus, was primarily concerned
with the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to issue the writ, especially after it had
limited its original jurisdiction in Marbury v. Madison,3 1 along with the
separate-but no less important--question of whether federal courts could
issue writs against state proceedings where no underlying federal claim existed,
and vice versa. Though Chief Justice Marshall's treatment of both issues has
met with significant criticism, one pronouncement from Bollman has not. One
of the arguments raised at bar had been whether the writ had been suspended,
especially during the pendency of the litigation below. 33 Responding to this
assertion at the end of his opinion for the Court, Marshall concluded that "If at
any time the public safety should require the suspension of the powers vested
by this act in the courts of the United States, it is for the legislature to say so.
That question depends on political considerations, on which the legislature is to
decide." 34 Thus, Chief Justice Marshall emphatically placed the Suspension
Power in the hands of Congress, even if he did so in dicta.
35
Whereas Bollman reached the issue of which branch possessed the
Suspension Power, another early Marshall Court decision also invoked the role
of Congress in sanctioning executive seizures of persons and property. At issue
in Brown v. United States was whether the U.S. government could condemn
British property captured as a result of an embargo authorized by Congress
during the War of 1812 that was not intended to act on foreign property. 36 As
Chief Justice Marshall, again writing for the Court, set out, "[t]he questions to
be decided by the Court are: 1st. May enemy's property, found on land at the
commencement of hostilities, be seized and condemned as a necessary
consequence of the declaration of war? 2d. Is there any legislative act which
authorizes such seizure and condemnation?"
37
Marshall proceeded to answer both questions in the negative. To the first
question, he concluded:
That the declaration of war has only the effect of placing the two nations in a state
of hostility, of producing a state of war, of giving those rights which war confers;
but not of operating, by its own force, any of those results, such as a transfer of
property, which are usually produced by ulterior measures of government, is fairly
deducible from the enumeration of powers which accompanies that of declaring
war. 'Congress shall have power'-'to declare war, grant letters of marque and
reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water.'
31. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
32. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 21, at 20-28.
33. See, e.g., Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 91-92.
34. Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
35. In his 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Justice Story espoused a
similar view. See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1336 (photo. reprint 1991) (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833).
36. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
37. Id. at 123.
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... If [the latter power] extends to rules respecting enemy property found
within the territory, then we perceive an express grant to congress of the power in
question as an independent substantive power, not included in that of declaring
38
war.
Thus, "the declaration of war does not, of itself, authorize proceedings
against the persons or property of the enemy found, at the time, within the
territory. 39 In one of the critical passages of the opinion, Marshall next went
on to cite various acts of Congress for support, showing how Congress had
additionally authorized, in the Alien Enemy Act of 1798, 40 the detention and
deportation of alien enemies within the United States during wartime, and how,
in 1812, it also authorized the President to make "arrangements for the safe
keeping, support, and exchange of prisoners of war.",4 1 If these were
independent war powers of the President that came part and parcel with the
congressional declaration of war, Marshall asked, why would Congress have
acted to independently authorize or delegate them? 42 Thus, as Marshall wrote,
the right of the sovereign in wartime "to take the persons and confiscate the
property of the enemy" is "an independent substantive power" of Congress, and
not the executive.43 Any argument that Brown was limited to wartime
condemnation of property, and not to the detention of combatants, was
precluded by the Brown Court itself. "War gives an equal right over persons
and property," Chief Justice Marshall concluded, and thus the constitutional
limitations on seizures of either must be the same.44
Brown, one of a number of interesting military authority cases arising out
of the War of 1812, 45 thus stands for two propositions of undeniable
38. Id. at 125-26 (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 126 (emphasis added). This argument thus expanded on the Court's earlier holding in
Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 178-79 (1804), that the President lacked authority in excess of
that provided by Congress to make maritime captures during a conflict with France.
40. See Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, § 1, 1 Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-24
(2000)). Passed in between its far more notorious siblings-the Alien and Sedition Acts-the Alien
Enemy Act is the only one of the three that today remains on the books. See generally Ludecke v.
Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) (discussing the Act and its history).
41. See Act ofJuly 6, 1812, ch. 128, 2 Stat. 777 (repealed 1817).
42. Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 128-29. Similarly, the Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271 (as
amended by the Act of Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424) authorized the President to use such of the
militias of the several states to repel invasions or otherwise suppress rebellions as he saw fit, and today's
version, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 332, also authorizes the use of the federal armed forces. See 10 U.S.C.
§ 332. If the executive's constitutional war power included as inherent powers such of those described
above, then, first, Congress would never have needed to delegate such in the first instance, and second,
all of these statutes-the Militia Act, the Alien Enemy Act, and the 1812 Prisoner of War Act, among
others-would be unconstitutional. Yet none have ever been struck down, though the 1812 Prisoner of
War Act was repealed in 1817 after the war was over. See Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 34, 3 Stat. 358; see
also infra note 62 (discussing the constitutional validity of the Militia Act).
43. Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 122, 126 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 126.
45. A series of New York State cases arising out of the war dealt more squarely with questions of
military authority over civilians, particularly those accused of espionage. See Smith v. Shaw, 12 Johns.
257 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815); McConnell v. Hampton, 12 Johns. 234 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815); In re Stacy,
10 Johns. 328 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813). Indeed, Smith (and a series of other contemporary cases) rejected
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significance: First, declarations of war do not, in and of themselves,
independently authorize anything, except the use of military force and the
general understanding that there exists a state of war.46 Second, those powers
granted by Congress to the executive during wartime, including the power to
"authorize proceedings against the person and the property of the enemy," are
triggered by declarations of war, but nothing more-Congress only activates
wartime authority in declaring war, it does not expand it.47 Thus, the power to
detain, under Brown, would have to be independently delegated by Congress,
in one form or another.
B. The Suspension Power and the Civil War
Notwithstanding Bollman and Brown, the question of the executive's
unilateral authority to detain U.S. citizens during times of emergency arose
most dramatically during the Civil War,48 in a series of cases challenging
President Abraham Lincoln's-and not Congress's-suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus at the outset of hostilities. 49 After the initial suspension, Lincoln
subsequently extended the suspension geographically, a measure that was
eventually ratified by Congress in a broad, all-encompassing endorsement of
the beleaguered President's earlier actions. 51  Nevertheless, Ex parte
the military's authority to detain and try civilians for spying because it found no statutory authorization.
See generally Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The President's Power To Detain "Enemy Combatants": Modern
Lessons from Mr. Madison's Forgotten War, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 17-
23, on file with author).
46. Subsequent cases would clarify that there could exist a state of war prior to a congressional
declaration thereto, and that the authority to determine when a war had begun properly belonged to the
executive. Barring a preexisting determination, however, a congressional declaration was authoritative.
See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). Additionally, in 1850, the Court held,
continuing the Brown understanding, that a congressional declaration of war did not include a delegation
of its rulemaking authority. See Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615 (1850).
47. Cf. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 178-79 (1804) (rejecting President Jefferson's use
of authority in excess of that explicitly set out by Congress during a maritime conflict with France).
48. The suspension issue only truly arose one other time before the war-at the very end of the
War of 1812, when then-General Andrew Jackson suspended the writ in New Orleans. The New Orleans
saga, an interesting historical footnote but tangential to the argument herein, is excellently surveyed in
George M. Dennison, Martial Law. The Development of a Theory of Emergency Powers, 1776-1861,
18 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 52, 61-65 (1974); and Abraham D. Sofaer, Emergency Power and the Hero of
New Orleans, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 233,243-52 (1981).
49. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 25
(1998). Chapter 2 of Chief Justice Rehnquist's book discusses the factual background leading to
Lincoln's suspension of the writ. 1d. at 11-25; see also MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY:
ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 7-9 (1991).
50. The suspension became nationwide in August of 1862, when Secretary of War Edwin M.
Stanton issued an order "by direction of the President" suspending the writ for those resisting the draft
and for "persons arrested for disloyal practices." See REHNQUIST, supra note 49, at 59-60.
51. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755, 755 ("[D]uring the present rebellion, the
President of the United States, whenever, in his judgment, the public safety may require it, is authorized
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in any case throughout the United States, or any
part thereof."). The Supreme Court subsequently (though indirectly) sustained the 1863 Act in Mitchell
v. Clark, 110 U.S. 633 (1884).
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Merryman,52 the first of a series of cases to arise out of Lincoln's unilateral
suspension,53 witnessed a harsh rebuke of the action by Chief Justice Roger B.
Taney, who ruled that the President had no independent authority to suspend
the writ, particularly because the Suspension Clause was located in Article I of
the Constitution, not Article II. As Taney wrote, "I had supposed it to be one of
those points in constitutional law upon which there was no difference of
opinion ... that the privilege of the writ could not be suspended, except by act
of congress." 54 Yet, Lincoln completely ignored Taney's stem ruling,
55
famously noting before Congress, one month later, that Taney's decision would
allow "all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to
pieces, lest that one be violated.,
56
On its face, Merryman was emblematic of a resistance to unilateral
executive authority to suspend the writ. However, the writ remained suspended
solely by executive order until Congress finally acted in March of 1863, by
which point thousands of U.S. citizens had been arrested and detained without
charges. Indeed, to this day, the debate over which branch may properly
suspend the writ is, at least officially, unresolved, 57 though most legal
scholars58 -and, indeed, most courts5 9 -have long since considered the
question settled.
52. 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (Taney, C.J.).
53. For a detailed exposition of the background of Merryman, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 81, 89-92 (1993).
54. Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 148; see also Exparte Benedict, 3 F. Cas. 159, 165 (N.D.N.Y. 1862)
(No. 1292) ("[T]he power of suspension is a legislative and not an executive power, and must be
exercised, or its exercise authorized, by congress."); Johnson v. Duncan, 3 Mart. (o.s.) 530 (La. 1815).
55. This, as one recent scholar noted, is the true importance of Merryman. See Paulsen, supra note
53, at 92 ("But the more important question framed by Merryman concerns not the interpretation of the
writ suspension provision, but whether the Executive is bound to enforce a judicial decree that he
believes is founded on an incorrect reading of the law."). Paulsen is too generous. The real question,
which has not been answered yet, is: If a sitting president defies a judicial order in the name of
emergency, what-if any-remedies do the courts have to enforce their mandates?
56. Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861, reprinted in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 430 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
57. See CLINTON ROSSITER & RICHARD P. LONGAKER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
COMMANDER IN CHIEF 25 (expanded ed. 1976) ("It would seem equally futile to argue over the present
location of this power, for it is a question on which fact and theory cannot be expected to concur. Today,
as ninety years ago, the answer to it is not to be found in law but in circumstance.").
58. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 24, at 1263-64. But
see Martin S. Sheffer, Presidential Power To Suspend Habeas Corpus: The Taney-Bates Dialogue and
Ex parte Merryman, 11 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1 (1986).
59. See, e.g., McCall v. McDowell, 15 F. Cas. 1235 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867) (No. 8673); Benedict, 3 F.
Cas. 159; In re Dunn, 8 F. Cas. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1863) (No. 4171); In re Fagan, 8 F. Cas. 947 (D. Mass.
1863) (No. 4604); Ex parte McDonald, 143 P. 947 (Mont. 1914). As Professor Duker highlights, "[t]he
Supreme Court has never dealt directly with the issue"; however, in Ex parte Milligan, the Court-in
examining the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act of 1863--"stated that '[t]he President was authorized by
it to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus... ' Thus, in sustaining the suspension of
habeas before it in Milligan, the Court looked to Congress's authority, and not the executive's, over the
government's arguments to the contrary. DUKER, supra note 20, at 177 n. 188 (citation omitted).
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C. An Emergency Exception? Insurrection and Martial Law During the Early
Republic and the Civil War
Another question that both Bollman and Merryman left unresolved was
whether the same constitutional mandates vis-A-vis suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus applied in the context of martial law, in areas where there were
no lawful civilian authorities. Indeed, the question of whether the imposition of
martial law provides an exception to our understanding of the detention power
is a critically important one, for if it does not, then it is difficult to conceive of
more exigent circumstances that would.
Martial law, under the Constitution, is reflected in the Militia Clauses (in
addition to the Suspension Clause), which collectively authorize Congress:
To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union,
suppress insurrections and repel invasions; [Prd]
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for
governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States,
reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the
authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by
Congress.
60
Acting under this power, Congress passed the Militia Act of 1792, which
created a uniform national militia, and amended such in 1795 to authorize the
President, "whenever the United States shall be invaded, or be in imminent
danger of invasion from any foreign nation or Indian tribe," to call forth the
militia.6 1 Thus, the Third Congress delegated to the President the authority to
respond to sudden invasions or other insurrections, a power that the executive
did not otherwise derive from the Constitution itself.
62
Since the passage of the 1795 Act, it has generally been read as
congressional authorization for the imposition of martial law under the
circumstances provided for by the Constitution. 63 The question of significance
here, first raised during the Civil War (but returned to during World War II),
was whether the imposition of martial law ipso facto authorized the suspension
of habeas, and, consequently, the invocation of the detention power.
60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 15-16.
61. Act of Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 36, § 1, 1 Stat. 424, 424 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 332
(2000)). The authority to call forth the militia of the several states was expanded to include the authority
to call forth the federal armed forces in 1861. See Act of July 29, 1861, ch. 25, § 1, 12 Stat. 281, 281.
Thus, the power to use federal troops to suppress insurrections also derives from the 1795 Militia Act.
62. In 1827, the Supreme Court settled any question as to the constitutionality of the 1795 Act. See
Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 29 (1827) ("[T]he act of 1795 is within the constitutional
authority of Congress .... ); see also Raymond v. Thomas, 91 U.S. 712, 714-15 (1875). See generally
DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801, at 160-62 &
n.228 (1997) (discussing the legislative history of the Militia Acts, the delegation of congressional
power at their core, and Justice Story's affirmation thereof in Martin v. Mott).
63. See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42-45 (1849) ("By this act, the power of
deciding whether the exigency had arisen upon which the government of the United States is bound to
interfere, is given to the President." (emphasis added)).
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In Ex parte Field,6 4 the Civil War case first expounding this theory, the
conflict centered on President Lincoln's imposition of martial law in "loyal"
states nowhere near the front lines, such as Vermont, and whether that
included, by necessity, a suspension of habeas. After exhaustively recounting
the precedents, District Judge David A. Smalley concluded that the President
had lawfully imposed martial law on Vermont, and that "[i]t must be evident to
all, that martial law and the privilege of [the] writ [of habeas corpus] are
wholly incompatible with each other."65 Thus, the imposition of martial law
necessarily included the suspension of habeas.
To distinguish Merryman and a similarly reasoned case, Ex parte Benedict,
Judge Smalley relied both on the extent to which martial law had been declared
nationwide in Field, but had not yet at the time of the former cases, and also,
critically, on the importance of the 1795 Militia Act.66 Congress, via the Militia
Act, delegated broad power to the executive to impose martial law during
emergencies, and that power necessarily included the Suspension Power. Judge
Smalley did not explicitly state the most obvious conclusion of his argument,
but implicitly, it was undeniable: Congress itself, via the 1795 Act, authorized
the suspension of habeas at the outset of the Civil War.67 Thus, Merryman and
Benedict wrongly presupposed the absence of congressional action to suspend
the writ. 68 Regardless of the resolution of the Field question, it is of undeniable
significance that Field, like Benedict and Merryman before it, presupposed that
the detention power always emanated from Congress, whether it had been
delegated or not.
69
64. 9 F. Cas. I (C.C.D. Vt. 1862) (No. 4761).
65. Id. at 8.
66. Id.
67. See FARBER, supra note 5, at 162-63. For an example of another Civil War-era court adopting a
form of this argument, see In re Kemp, 16 Wis. 382 (1863). Curiously, in denouncing the unilateralism
of Lincoln's acts, most scholars have traditionally overlooked the martial law/emergency argument.
See, e.g., Eli Palomares, Note, Illegal Confinement. Presidential Authority To Suspend the Privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus During Times of Emergency, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 101 (2002).
68. The relationship between martial law and habeas would largely be left alone in the aftermath of
the Civil War, but in 1909, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes largely embraced-albeit implicitly-Judge
Smalley's theory in Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909). In Moyer, the issue was whether the extra-
judicial detention, for two and one-half months, of a citizen under order of the Governor of Colorado
was lawful under the Colorado and federal Constitutions. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, rejected
the contention that such detention violated the Fourteenth Amendment. As he wrote, "what is due
process of law depends on circumstances." Id. at 84. Because the Colorado Constitution authorized the
governor to declare martial law, it naturally conveyed the right to detain individuals for the duration of
the emergency. See also FARBER, supra note 5, at 162-63.
69. Indeed, even the Prize Cases, a series of Civil War admiralty cases that have been read to
suggest a broader form of executive constitutional power than that endorsed here, relied on the 1795
Militia Act as authority for President Lincoln's imposition of a blockade-and seizure of ships
attempting to run it-at the beginning of hostilities. Compare Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F.
Supp. 2d 564, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("'1 read the Prize Cases to stand for the proposition that the
President has independent authority to repel aggressive acts by third parties even without specific
congressional authorization, and courts may not review the level of force selected."' (quoting Campbell
v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman, J., concurring))), with The Prize Cases, 67 U.S.
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D. Past as Prologue: Milligan and Military Tribunals
Compared to the suspension of habeas, however, the trial of civilians before
military tribunals was "certainly the most dubious and judicially assailable" of
President Lincoln's questionable actions against civil liberties during the Civil
War. 70 These trials formed the factual background to two Civil War cases, Ex
parte Vallandigham71 and Ex parte Milligan,72 the latter of which is of
importance to the argument here for two different reasons: First, at issue in
Milligan was not the President's authority to carry out military tribunals
authorized by Congress, but rather his independent authority to create them in
the first place. Second, Milligan remains today the boldest and most definitive
statement on the availability of martial law in peaceful areas, despite the extent
to which later cases may have limited its other holdings.
At its core, Milligan rejected the President's authority to act unilaterally
during wartime to detain and try civilians by military commissions in areas
where the civil courts were open and functioning properly, as in Indianapolis,
where Lamdin P. Milligan was detained and tried.73 Neither the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1863 nor any other Act of Congress had authorized the commissions at
issue in Milligan, and, though the Court split 5-4 on the question of whether
Congress was also constitutionally barred from authorizing such
commissions, 74 all nine Justices agreed that President Lincoln certainly could
not create them unilaterally, since neither the Constitution nor Congress had
granted him the power to do so.
Additionally, the Milligan Court clarified an issue that had been raised first
(2 Black) 635, 668 (1863) ("[The President] has no power to initiate or declare a war either against a
foreign nation or a domestic State. But by the Acts of Congress of February 28th, 1795, and 3d of
March, 1807, he is authorized to called [sic] out the militia and use the military and naval forces of the
United States in case of invasion by foreign nations, and to suppress insurrection against the government
of a State or of the United States.").
70. RoSSITER & LONGAKER, supra note 57, at 26.
71. 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 243 (1864). In Vallandigham, the Court refused to issue a writ of certiorari
(rare at the time) to review an Indiana politician's conviction by a military commission for anti-war
speech based on its determination that the military commission was not a "court" under Section 14 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82, and that it therefore did not fall under the
Court's appellate jurisdiction, including its authority to grant certiorari. 68 U.S. (I Wall.) at 251.
72. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
73. This proved to be the critical "linchpin" that allowed the Court to revisit (and distinguish)
Vallandigham. See ROSSITER & LONGAKER, supra note 57, at 32.
74. Chief Justice Chase, along with Associate Justices Miller, Swayne, and Wayne, wrote that, "the
opinion which has just been read goes further; and as we understand it, asserts not only that the military
commission held in Indiana was not authorized by Congress, but that it was not in the power of
Congress to authorize it .... We cannot agree to this." Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 136 (Chase, C.J.).
Thus, "Congress had power, though not exercised, to authorize the military commission which was held
in Indiana." Id. at 137. The opinion of the Court made no such distinction between unilateral executive
power and the power of the executive acting in concert with the legislature. It was because of this
conflation-and not the agreement of all nine Justices rejecting the independent executive authority-
that Milligan has received such a dubious reception from the modem academy. See, e.g., ROSSITER &
LONGAKER, supra note 57, at 32.
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in Luther v. Borden, but never settled: What were the limits, both geographic
and temporal, on the imposition of martial law during an emergency? As
Justice Davis wrote,
[T]here are occasions when martial rule can be properly applied. If, in foreign
invasion or civil war, the courts are actually closed, and it is impossible to
administer criminal justice according to law, then, on the theatre of active military
operations, where war really prevails, there is a necessity to furnish a substitute for
the civil authority, thus overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and society;
and as no power is left but the military, it is allowed to govern by martial rule until
the laws can have their free course. As necessity creates the rule, so it limits its
duration; for, if this government is continued after the courts are reinstated, it is a
gross usurpation of power. Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open,
and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction. It is also confined
to the locality of actual war.
75
Thus, whereas Milligan, in the present debate, is of undeniable importance
for its stance on the constitutional validity (or lack thereof) of military
commissions to try civilians,7 6 it is equally important for imposing the above
constraint on the declaration of martial law. The Field argument-that martial
law ipso facto includes a suspension of habeas-is thus informed by the
Milligan response, for suspension under the Militia Act could only be in areas
where the courts were not "open... and unobstructed." Further, though the
distinction between military tribunals for civilians and combatants would be at
the heart of the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Ex parte Quirin,77
Milligan clearly "hold[s] congressional authorization to be at least a necessary
requirement for such tribunals. This general principle of Milligan-a principle
never repudiated in subsequent cases-leaves the President little unilateral
freedom to craft an order to detain people on his own suspicion for indefinite
warehousing."
78
II. THE DETENTION POWER DURING WORLD WAR II: NAZI SABOTEURS,
INTERNEES, HAWAIIAN MARTIAL LAW, AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS
A. Ex parte Quirin, Enemy Citizens, and Military Tribunals
Milligan returned to the forefront in 1942 with Ex parte Quirin, the so-
called "Nazi Saboteurs" case, which has been cited as the major precedent for
two of the more controversial policies pursued by the Bush Administration in
the aftermath of September 1I-the authority to create military tribunals to try
75. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 127.
76. Id. at 121.
77. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
78. Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military
Tribunals, Il1 YALE L.J. 1259, 1279-80 (2002). This reading of Milligan, though not often highlighted,
is fairly well established. Indeed, even Rossiter-who has criticized Milligan as overreaching on a
number of different points, including the notion that not even Congress had the authority to authorize
the commissions-agreed with this understanding. See ROSSITER & LONGAKER, supra note 57, at 36.
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suspected terrorists, 79 and the authority to detain "unlawful" or "enemy"
combatants. 0 In Quirin, eight Nazi soldiers had landed in the United States
with the intent to sabotage key components of the American war industry.
George Dasch, one of the cadre, turned himself in to authorities, and then
proceeded to help the FBI capture the other seven. President Roosevelt
subsequently promulgated an executive order authorizing trial by military
commissions for the saboteurs, who, during those proceedings, filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in the D.C. district court, which was summarily
dismissed . Quickly, the case worked its way to the Supreme Court, which,
sitting in Special Term, found the commissions constitutional.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court was faced with the necessity of
distinguishing the factual circumstances before it from those present in
Milligan." This distinction turned on two critical facts: First, the petitioners in
Quirin, unlike those in Milligan, were actively engaged in combat against the
United States, and as such, were not civilians, but were combatants,
"unlawful," in this case, because they were engaged in spying and sabotage. 83
Second, as opposed to Milligan, where the military commissions had been
created unilaterally by President Lincoln, in Quirin, there was at least some
congressional authorization-via the Articles of War.
8 4
Thus, though the Court endorsed President Roosevelt's authority to capture
and detain "enemy belligerents" and to try "unlawful" belligerents before a
military commission, the endorsement was pinned almost entirely on the extent
to which Roosevelt was enforcing laws already passed by Congress.
85
79. See, e.g., Mike Allen, Bush Defends Order for Military Tribunals, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2001,
at A14 (quoting a statement from President Bush that "I would remind those who don't understand the
decision I made that Franklin Roosevelt made the same decision in World War If. Those were
extraordinary times, as well.").
80. See, e.g., Respondents' Response to, and Motion To Dismiss, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus at 7, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 2:02cv439) (on file with
author).
81. Ex parte Quirin, 47 F. Supp. 431 (D.D.C. 1942). For what are easily the two most
comprehensive modem discussions of Quirin written before September 11, see Michal R. Belknap, The
Supreme Court Goes to War: The Meaning and Implications of the Nazi Saboteur Case, 89 MIL. L. REV.
59 (1980); and David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs' Case, I J. SUP. CT. HIST. 61 (1996). Not surprisingly,
Quirin has also been an inordinately popular subject of post-September 11 scholarship. For the most in-
depth contribution thereto, see LOUIS FISHER, NAzI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL: A MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND
AMERICAN LAW (2003). See also Katyal & Tribe, supra note 78, at 1280-83 (providing a narrower
discussion of the 1942 case).
82. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45-46.
83. Id. at 35 ("[T]hose who during time of war pass surreptitiously from enemy territory into our
own, discarding their uniforms upon entry, for the commission of hostile acts involving destruction of
life or property, have the status of unlawful combatants punishable as such by military commission.").
84. Id. at 29 ("It is unnecessary for present purposes to determine to what extent the President as
Commander in Chief has constitutional power to create military commissions without the support of
Congressional legislation. For here Congress has authorized trial of offenses against the law of war
before such commissions."). Milligan established the limits on the President's unilateral authority, and
Quirin did not alter that pronouncement.
85. Id. at 28 ("By his Order creating the present Commission he has undertaken to exercise the
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Critically, the Court read the President's Commander-in-Chief power
exhaustively as
the power to wage war which Congress has declared, and to carry into effect all
laws passed by Congress for the conduct of war and for the government and
regulation of the Armed Forces, and all laws defining and punishing offenses
. 86
against the law of nations, including those which pertain to the conduct of war.
Thus, Quirin, a decision manifestly predicated on congressional
authorization, 87 read the President's power to detain and try combatants, be
they unlawful or otherwise, not in the Commander-in-Chief Clause of the
Constitution, but in his power to enforce the Articles of War, a statutory
authority conferred upon him by Congress."). The Articles of War in force during World War II were
enacted by Congress in 1920. See Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, 41 Stat. 759, 787-812. Whereas Articles
81 and 82 clearly applied to the petitioners in Quirin, the Court was also on fairly solid ground in
concluding that Congress, via Article 15, had otherwise authorized military tribunals for violations of
the laws of war. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 30 ("Congress has the choice of crystallizing in permanent form
and minute detail every offense against the law of war, or of adopting the system of common law
applied by military tribunals so far as it should be recognized and deemed applicable by the courts. It
chose the latter course.").
The problem with the opinion, and the quandary that has continued to plague scholars up until
today, is the extent to which the military commission ordered by President Roosevelt differed
substantially from the requirements the 1920 Articles laid out. In several significant ways, the tribunal
that tried the Quirin petitioners did not include the safeguards mandated by the 1920 Articles, including
independent review of convictions and the requirement of a unanimous verdict for the death penalty. See
FISHER, supra note 81, at 129-34. Thus, to find the tribunal to be a legitimate exercise of the executive's
authority in enforcing the laws Congress passed was a legal fiction, and a disturbing one at that. What is
critical, however, is that the Court invented such a fiction rather than uphold the constitutionality of the
trial based solely on the executive's constitutional authority. Such authority did not exist, and the Court,
its many other missteps in Quirin notwithstanding, clearly did not otherwise suggest that it did.
86. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 26; see also United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 14 (1955)
(endorsing a limited reading of the Clause); United States v. Sweeny, 157 U.S. 281, 284 (1895) (same).
Such a reading is also consistent with one of the original interpretations of the Clause. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 69, at 418 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("It would amount to
nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General
and Admiral of the Confederacy."); see also JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY:
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 5 (1993) ("Proponents of broad executive
authority... often rely on the constitutional designation of the President as 'Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States,' but the record is entirely clear that all this was meant to convey
was command of the armed forces once Congress had authorized a war .. "). Ely further notes that
[w]holly missing in either the Philadelphia debates or The Federalist, or in the ratification
debates, is any broader construction of the term. The Federalists did not construe it broadly in
an effort to build the power of the executive, and neither did the Antifederalists as part of their
attack on the inordinate executive power allegedly created by the document they were seeking
to defeat.
Id. at 142 n.22 (citations omitted). But cf. EDWARD S. CORWIN ET AL., THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND
POWERS, 1787-1984, at 262-97 (5th rev. ed. 1984) (discussing the evolution of the Commander-in-Chief
power from the original understanding to the so-called "stewardship" theory during total wars, such as
World War II).
87. In two different World War lI-era cases, the Supreme Court embraced this reading. See In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 20 (1946) ("By thus recognizing military commissions in order to preserve their
traditional jurisdiction over enemy combatants unimpaired by the Articles [of War], Congress gave
sanction, as we held in Ex parte Quirin, to any use of the military commission contemplated by the
common law of war."); see also Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 355 (1952) (recognizing this holding
from Quirin and quoting the discussion from Yamashita). This is one of the deeper underpinnings of
Katyal and Tribe's argument. See Katyal & Tribe, supra note 78, at 1266-68; see also supra note 85
(discussing the reliance on the Articles of War).
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authorization. 88 The Quirin Court did not say that the President lacked such
power independently; rather, it refused even to reach that question, finding a
sufficient basis in the actions of Congress. 89 Nevertheless, this understanding of
the 1942 decision, previously overlooked, is essential.
Quirin also set another key precedent by obliterating any distinction
between unlawful combatants who were German nationals and those who were
U.S. citizens. 90 Yet, despite its apparent validity as authority for denying U.S.
citizens at arms against the United States any additional rights compared to
non-citizen combatants, its approval of military commissions to try offenses
against the laws of war, and its other suggested shortcomings, Quirin, a
paradoxical and controversial case through and through, 9' quite simply does
not stand for propositions as broad as those for which it has been cited in the
aftermath of September 1 1--especially the argument that the President has
inherent and unilateral constitutional authority to detain and try enemy
combatants92 during wartime. For everything Quirin was, it was not, under any
tenable reading, an endorsement of an executive detention power.
93
B. Enemy Citizen Prisoners of War
Quirin's obfuscation of the line between U.S. citizen and non-citizen
enemies had limited-but significant-repercussions in two other World War
88. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 26-27; see Vladeck, supra note 10, at 965 n.24 ("Quirin... clearly located
the President's power to detain and try unlawful combatants during wartime in Congress's Articles of
War and not in the Constitution. Under Quirin, then, a President's detention power derives from the
Constitution only to the extent that it is delegated by Congress.").
89. See supra note 84 (quoting this conclusion from Quirin).
90. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37 ("Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not
relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in violation of the law of
war.").
91. Many recent scholars, in their attempts to distinguish Quirin, have relied on the novelty and
exigency of the circumstances under which it was decided. See, e.g., G. Edward White, Felix
Frankfurter's "Soliloquy" in Ex parte Quirin: Nazi Sabotage and Constitutional Conundrums, 5 GREEN
BAG 2D 423, 423 (2002) ("Occasionally Supreme Court Justices find themselves confronted with cases
that present an awkward combination of relatively novel constitutional issues, potentially momentous
short-run consequences, and considerable pressure for a quick decision.... Ex parte Quirin... was
such a case."). Quirin was exceptional, but that is not how it should be distinguished. Rather, it is
distinguishable because it does not implicate the detention power at all. It neither upheld nor rejected an
executive power to detain, just as it neither upheld nor rejected an executive power to create military
tribunals. It was legal prevarication to the fullest, but that is why a proper understanding of the 1942
case is so important here.
92. Indeed, even Quirin's coinage of the term "enemy combatant" may have been entirely
accidental, since, from the plain language of the opinion, the term only meant to distinguish enemy
members of the armed forces from enemy spies or allies. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31 (discussing "[t]he
spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a belligerent in time of war,... or an
enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war
by destruction of life or property"). Nowhere else in the opinion is the term even mentioned, let alone
used to create a category distinct from lawful and unlawful combatants.
93. But see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi 111), 316 F.3d 450, 463 (4th Cir. 2003), petition for cert.
filed, No. 03-6696 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2003).
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II-era cases. The latter, Colepaugh v. Looney,9 4 upheld a later version of
military tribunals for a second group of Nazi saboteurs, though the government,
perhaps wary of the Quirin debacle, followed the procedures set forth in the
1920 Articles much more closely the second time around.95
The earlier case presented a slightly different issue: What about prisoners
of war? Gaetano Territo was an American citizen captured while fighting for
the Italian Army in Italy in 1943. Territo, unlike the petitioners in Quirin, had
committed no violation against the laws of war, and was, by all accounts, a
"lawful" combatant, and thus a POW entitled to the protections afforded by the
1929 Geneva Conventions.96 Territo filed a habeas petition in the Southern
District of California, challenging his detention as a POW on the grounds that
he was a citizen. The court summarily dismissed the petition, and Territo
appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected Territo's argument by reference both
to Quirin and to the 1929 Geneva Conventions themselves. 97 Yet, the Territo
court never identified the actual source of the authority for detaining U.S.
citizens as prisoners of war. If anything, the only authority cited as support for
detaining Territo as a POW were the Geneva Conventions, which the court
invoked repeatedly. 98 Thus, Territo might otherwise suggest the argument that
Congress authorized the detention of POWs when the Senate ratified the 1929
Geneva Convention, and that the Supremacy Clause thus made the Convention
the "Law of the Land," similar, if not equivalent, to an Act of Congress. This
contention is quite unsatisfying, however, as the ratification of a treaty is not a
congressional act-it is strictly the province of the Senate, without the
requirements of bicameralism or presentment.
But if the Geneva Convention did not itself authorize the detention of U.S.
citizens as POWs, what did? The Ninth Circuit did not say, and no
commentator has ever tried to reconcile this distinction-between Quirin's
reliance on the Articles of War and the lack of a similar proviso in Territo.
Brown, in 1814, had located the power to detain POWs in an 1812 Act of
Congress, but that Act was repealed in 1817. 99 If anything, Territo stands for
the proposition that POWs are lawfully detained somehow, even if no court has
ever suggested the actual source of authority thereto. This opens up the
possibility-which the Ninth Circuit did not itself suggest-that the
executive's power to detain POWs actually may come from the Constitution,
94. 235 F.2d 429 (10th Cir. 1956) (upholding the second round of military commissions).
95. See FISHER, supra note 81, at 138-44.
96. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 118 L.N.T.S. 343.
These protections included the right not to be tried; thus, Territo could not be indicted for treason or
levying war against the United States, even though he was very likely guilty of both offenses.
97. In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1946).
98. Id. at 146-47 & n.5.
99. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text (discussing Brown and the two Acts).
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once Congress has actually declared war (and triggered the Geneva
Conventions), subject to the due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment.
Whether the source of such authority is the Commander-in-Chief Clause or the
executive's broad discretion over foreign affairs is a different question
altogether (though it would seem to be the latter, based on the original
understanding of the formerl00), but it certainly is defensible that the authority
to detain combatants as POWs may possibly be a power inherently belonging
to the executive.'0 1 If nothing else, it is an issue that, at least prior to the
enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) in 1971, would fall into Justice Jackson's
"zone of twilight" from Steel Seizure. 102
Territo was ultimately unclear on this point, and I do not mean to otherwise
infer clarity where none exists. Instead, what is important about Territo is that
the actual source of the executive's power to detain U.S. citizens captured on
the battlefield as enemy prisoners of war remains an open question today, a
question that may eventually be unavoidable, but that, at least in the present
cases, is not otherwise implicated.
C. Martial Law in Hawaii
As opposed to Territo, where the source of the detention authority was
unclear at best, the detention of citizens in Hawaii during World War II was a
different story. Hawaii, a U.S. territory until 1959, was governed by the
Organic Act-a statute passed in 1900 when it first came under U.S. control.
10 3
The Organic Act included a provision allowing the imposition of martial law
under certain emergencies. 0 4 After the attack on Pearl Harbor, just such an
emergency was declared, and control of the territory was surrendered to the
military. Soon thereafter, the civilian courts were closed, replaced with provost
courts for petty crimes and military tribunals for more serious offenses.
10 5
100. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing the Commander-in-Chief Clause).
101. This might otherwise provoke a debate over why there is a distinction between lawful and
unlawful combatants, save for one critical point: Under the Constitution, it is up to Congress to "define
and punish ... Offenses against the Law of Nations." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10. The Offenses
Clause has sparked heated academic debate in recent years over its import to the role of international
law in U.S. courts. Compare, e.g., Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power to
"Define and Punish... Offenses Against the Law of Nations, " 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447 (2000),
with Michael T. Morley, Note, The Law of Nations and the Offenses Clause of the Constitution: A
Defense of Federalism, 112 YALE L.J. 109 (2002). Nevertheless, since what makes a combatant
"unlawful" is some kind of offense against the law of nations, which must, by necessity, subsume the
laws of war, this distinction seems constitutionally appropriate, if even necessary. Under Territo, U.S.
citizens who take up arms against the United States as lawful combatants during wartime are properly
detained until the end of hostilities as POWs. Under Quirin, U.S. citizens who violate the laws of war in
fighting against the United States are detained and tried pursuant to statutes. Thus, neither of these types
of detention implicate the authority that this Note rejects. For further discussion, see supra note 6.
102. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
103. Act of Apr. 30, 1900, ch. 339, 31 Stat. 141.
104. See id. § 67, 31 Stat. at 153.
105. See FISHER, supra note 81, at 145-46. See generally J. GARNER ANTHONY, HAWAII UNDER
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Though the Ninth Circuit upheld the suspension of habeas under the terms
of the Organic Act in 1942,106 by the end of the year, it was clear that the
emergency had subsided, and the Hawaiian civil government was at least
partially restored via a February 8, 1943 proclamation from the local
government. On October 24, 1944, President Roosevelt issued a proclamation
restoring habeas and terminating the state of martial law.' 7 Lloyd Duncan, a
civilian, had twice been arrested and punished by the Hawaiian provost court,
the second time sentenced to five years at hard labor. After the restoration of
civilian authority, Duncan filed a habeas petition in the Hawaii district court,
which Judge Delbert E. Metzger, famous for his opposition to the military
government in Hawaii, 10 8 granted on the grounds that, after March 10, 1943
(the date the February 8 proclamation took effect), martial law had effectively
(if not formally) ceased to exist in Hawaii, and the military no longer possessed
lawful control over civilians. 109 Though the Ninth Circuit reversed Duncan and
its companion,' 10 the Supreme Court subsequently restored the effect, if not the
principle, of Judge Metzger's opinion.111
The Court's decision in Duncan v. Kahanamoku, building largely on
Milligan, reaffirmed the force of the 1866 decision--even in light of Quirin-
by focusing on Congress's intent in passing the Organic Act. Yes, Congress
clearly gave the Governor of Hawaii the authority to impose martial law, but
not indefinitely, and such authority did not include the power to try civilians for
civilian offenses in military courts.112 Thus, Duncan highlighted the most
important of the Milligan/Quirin distinctions-civilians versus unlawful
combatants. Indeed, the issue in Duncan was not whether Duncan's detention
was legal; rather, the issue was whether his trial was. The Court never reached
the question of the validity of the suspension of habeas; instead, it focused on
military tribunals, and the extent to which military trials could not supplant the
civilian justice system for non-combatant civilians. On this, the Court, with its
decision four years earlier in Quirin in mind, was unequivocal. 113
ARMY RULE (1955) (providing a detailed historical overview of the tumultuous history of Hawaii under
martial law); Harry N. Scheiber & Jane L. Scheiber, Bayonets in Paradise: A Htalf-Century Retrospect
on Martial Law in Hawai'i, 1941-1946, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 477 (1997)(same).
106. Exparte Zimmerman, 132 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1942).
107. See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 312 n.5 (1946).
108. See Claude McColloch, Now It Can Be Told: Judge Metzger and the Military, 35 A.B.A. J.
365 (1949); see also Scheiber & Scheiber, supra note 105, at 563-88 (summarizing the proceedings).
109. Ex parte Duncan, 66 F. Supp. 976, 979-81 (D. Haw. 1944); see also Ex parte White, 66 F.
Supp. 982 (D. Haw. 1944) (reaching a similar conclusion).
110. Exparte Duncan, 146 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1944).
111. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 322-24 (1946).
112. Id. at 323-24.
113. Id. Duncan thus further highlighted the exceptionalism of Quirin, and, as importantly, the
extent to which Quirin did not overrule Milligan, even though some have argued that it did. E.g.,
ARTHUR S. MILLER, PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A NUTSHELL 175 (1977); Martin S. Sheffer, Does
Absolute Power Corrupt Absolutely? Part . A Theoretical Review of Presidential War Powers,
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D. Internment and the Detention Power from Hirabayashi to Endo
Finally, no discussion of the detention power during World War II would
be complete without a discussion of the internment of hundreds of thousands of
Americans of Japanese descent in the western part of the mainland United
States, easily the most notorious of the U.S. government's actions during the
war-if not during the entire twentieth century. Yet, of the four major cases to
reach the Supreme Court challenging the intemments-Hirabayashi v. United
States, 114 Yasui v. United States, 115 Korematsu v. United States, 16 and Ex parte
Endo' 17 -- only Endo invoked the detention power itself. The other three-
Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu-all involved challenges to criminal
convictions for violating exclusion orders, an offense Congress criminalized
via statute.' 8 Though each case was replete with serious constitutional
questions, the dispositive issue in all three, due largely to the Court's reluctance
to confront the consitutional issues head-on,1 9 was the legality of the exclusion
orders themselves and the Act of Congress criminalizing violations thereof, and
not the constitutionality of (or authority for) the detention.' 20 Indeed,
Korematsu itself distinguished the two decisions: "The Endo case, post,
graphically illustrates the difference between the validity of an order to exclude
and the validity of a detention order after exclusion has been effected."
121
Korematsu dubiously upheld the former. Endo, however, rejected the latter,
since Mitsuye Endo had not violated anything. 22 The Court, in a decision
released on the same day as Korematsu, ordered Endo's discharge, largely
because Congress had not explicitly authorized her confinement. 23 As Justice
Douglas wrote for the Court,
[W]e stress the silence of the legislative history and of the Act and the Executive
Orders on the power to detain to emphasize that any such authority which exists
must be implied. If there is to be the greatest possible accommodation of the
24 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 233, 267 (1999). Quirin clearly endorsed and upheld military tribunals-in
compliance with procedures established by Congress-for U.S. citizens who violated the laws of war.
U.S. citizens who were prisoners of war were a different story, as Territo suggests. Duncan, then,
suggested that Milligan applied to all other U.S. citizens, precluding their trial by military commission,
and, implicitly (but necessarily), their military detention pending trial.
114. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
115. 320 U.S. 115 (1943).
116. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
117. 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
118. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-503, ch. 191, 56 Stat. 173 (repealed 1948).
119. See infra text accompanying note 226 (discussing Korematsu).
120. Historically, however, Korematsu was read as the Supreme Court's rubber stamp on the
internment program. See generally Joel B. Grossman, The Japanese American Cases and the Vagaries
of Constitutional Adjudication in Wartime: An Institutional Perspective, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 649 (1997)
(discussing the effect of Korematsu's holding); Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A
Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945) (same).
121. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 222.
122. See Patrick 0. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1933 (2003).
123. Endo, 323 U.S. at 300-02.
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liberties of the citizen with this war measure, any such implied p2 wer must be
narrowly confined to the precise purpose of the evacuation program.
Since the detention of "admittedly loyal" citizens such as Mitsuye Endo did not
fall under the "precise purpose" of the evacuation program, the Court ordered
her release.
25
Endo made no noticeable impact on the internment program, even though it
nominally required the release of 60,000 other "loyal" Americans of Japanese
descent, because the camps had already been closed by the time the decision
was issued.126 Additionally, though Endo may have been wrongly forgotten as
arguably the more meaningful of the two decisions, it was hardly perfect itself,
for the Court did not find that Endo's detention actually violated the
Constitution, a point that Justice Roberts, in his concurrence, as in his
dissenting opinion in Korematsu, criticized the majority for not reaching.' 27
Its shortcomings notwithstanding, Endo simultaneously suggests an
undeniable reluctance on the part of the Court to explicitly approve the policy
of interning Japanese Americans, and, more significantly, a reinforcement of
the idea that the detention of U.S. citizens, even during the most exigent
circumstances, generally requires preexisting authorization, even if such
acquiescence is implicit. Further, the Court's pronouncement that, in light of
implied authorization, the power to detain must be narrowly confined to the
precise purpose of the evacuation program, suggests an appropriate level of
judicial scrutiny for evaluating detention schemes when Congress has not
explicitly approved them, at least prior to the enactment of 18 U.S.C.
§ 4001(a).
Indeed, for all that Korematsu and its sister cases are scorned for, none ever
explicitly upheld any form of extra-legislative detention. Congress criminalized
violations of military exclusion orders, and it was the constitutionality of the
1942 statute that was at issue in Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu. This is not
to suggest that the Court was on any firmer ground in upholding the
convictions in each of the three earlier cases; it was just on different ground.
When the Court was finally confronted with the previously sidestepped issue of
the facial legality of the detentions, it balked-albeit in a decision that probably
could have been worded more harshly, and that history has otherwise forgotten.
124. Id. at 301-02.
125. Id. at 302-04; see also Grossman, supra note 120, at 662 (discussing the decision in Endo);
Gudridge, supra note 122, at 1947-53 (same).
126. See PETER H. IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 345 (1983). The impact of Endo behind the scenes, as
Irons notes, was quite formidable. Indeed, it is at least possible that, because of the Court's decision, the
Roosevelt Administration acted when it did, prompting Patrick Gudridge to quip: "lp]erhaps it's Felix
Frankfurter's fault" that no one remembers Endo. See Gudridge, supra note 122, at 1934-35.
127. Endo, 323 U.S. at 309 (Roberts, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Dennis J.
Hutchinson, "The Achilles Heel" of the Constitution: Justice Jackson and the Japanese Exclusion
Cases, 2002 SuP. CT. REV. 455, 476-87 (reprinting Justice Jackson's draft concurring opinion in Endo,
and surveying Jackson's overall discontent and anger over how the Court handled the cases).
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Endo did indeed close the camps, and in doing so, it reaffirmed the importance
of congressional authorization in any detention scheme. Yet again, when U.S.
citizens were detained without charge, the validity of the detention turned on
the actions of Congress, or the lack thereof.
Ii. THE DETENTION POWER AFTER WORLD WAR II: THE EMERGENCY
DETENTION ACT, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(A), AND CIVIL COMMITMENT
A. Steel Seizure and the Emergency Detention Act of 1950
What followed, in the early 1950s, were two significant precedents--one
legislative and one judicial-that further helped to clarify the scope of the
president's power to detain his own citizens: the September 23, 1950 override
of President Harry S Truman's veto of the Internal Security Act of 1950,128
which included, as Title II, the Emergency Detention Act,1 29 and the Supreme
Court's landmark decision on the scope and limits of presidential power during
national emergencies two years later in the Steel Seizure case. 30
The Internal Security Act, at the time of its enactment, "constitute[d] the
most comprehensive legislation which the United States has ever adopted to
deal with a threat to its internal security."1 31 It was also the reconciliation of
two very different approaches to protecting national security. Senator
McCarran's version of the bill focused on the registration of organizations and
persons "deemed to endanger American security. 13 2 By contrast, West
Virginia Senator Harley M. Kilgore, a staunch opponent of registration,
"offered a substitute measure providing for the detention of potential spies and
subversives whenever Congress and the President deemed the national safety to
be sufficiently imperiled."'' 33 After an extended period of legislative debate,
134
McCarran's proposal ended up forming the bulk of Title I of the Internal
128. Pub. L. No. 81-83 1, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987 (1950) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 50 U.S.C.).
129. Id., tit. II, 64 Stat. at 1019, 1019-31 (repealed 1971) [hereinafter EDA]. For an excellent
survey of the political background to the Act and the history of its existence, see Richard Longaker,
Emergency Detention: The Generation Gap, 1950-1971, 27 W. POL. Q. 395 (1974). See also Leslie W.
Dunbar, Beyond Korematsu: The Emergency Detention Act of 1950, 13 U. PITT. L. REV. 221 (1952).
130. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
131. Note, The Internal Security Act of 1950, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 606, 606 (1951). Two years prior
to the passage of the EDA, the Justice Department had secretly adopted a program, known as "the
Portfolio," under which "dangerous persons" could be interned in an emergency if so declared by the
executive. For an overview of the program, see Robert Justin Goldstein, An American Gulag? Summary
Arrest and Emergency Detention of Political Dissidents in the United States, 10 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 541, 558-61 (1978).
132. S. 4037, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); see also Note, supra note 131, at 606 n.3 (discussing the
origin of the registration provisions).
133. Note, supra note 131, at 606 (citing S. 4130. 81 st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950)).
134. For the legislative history behind the passage of the Internal Security Act, along with the
external events impacting the debates, see WILLIAM W. KELLER, THE LIBERALS AND J. EDGAR HOOVER:
RISE AND FALL OF A DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE STATE 36-55 (1989).
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Security Act, and Kilgore's proposal, in a somewhat different form, was the
basis for Title I-the Emergency Detention Act (EDA).
At the core of the EDA was the power of the Attorney General, once the
President proclaimed an "Internal Security Emergency," '1 35 to apprehend
anyone whom he believed to be dangerous.' 36 Though the overwhelming bulk
of the Act dealt with the procedures to be followed once an emergency had
been declared and detention had begun, the critical provisions--outlining what
constituted an "Internal Security Emergency" and delimiting the powers of the
executive branch when one was declared-were right at the beginning,
including, most importantly, section 102(a):
[I]f... the President shall find that the proclamation of an emergency pursuant to
this section is essential to the preservation, protection and defense of the
Constitution, and to the common defense and safety of the territory and people of
the United States, the President is authorized to make public proclamation of the
existence of an "Internal Security Emergency."
13 7
Thus, beginning in 1950, the President was given limited congressional
authorization to pursue a program of preventive, administrative detention
against anyone within the United States. Yet, a broader provision, authorizing
preventive detention in the event of an "imminent invasion" or a congressional
declaration of an "Internal Security Emergency," was rejected "because of fear
that the Constitution prohibits detention under the war powers except in the
event of active hostilities presenting a clear threat to national security." '138 The
Emergency Detention Act nowhere dealt with whether or not the President,
acting alone, has an inherent constitutional authority to detain U.S. citizens
under certain circumstances during wartime, 139 yet, its mere existence suggests
a conclusion all its own: If such power is inherently constitutional, why was the
Act necessary in the first place? In other words, if the President, prior to the
enactment of the Emergency Detention Act, could, in certain emergencies,
unilaterally detain U.S. citizens on his own constitutional authority, why would
Congress need to independently authorize such detentions?
140
With that in mind, the role of the Steel Seizure decision in the present
135. This could be done only upon invasion, declaration of war by Congress, or insurrection within
the United States "in aid of a foreign enemy." EDA § 102(a), 64 Stat. at 1021.
136. Id. §§ 103-04, 64 Stat. at 1021-22.
137. Id. § 102(a), 64 Stat. at 1021 (emphasis added).
138. Note, supra note 131, at 651 (emphasis added) (citing 96 CONG. REc. 14781.2, 14813 (1950)).
The EDA was still a terrifying grant of power, for "[t]he authority of the Attorney General was
uncontrolled. He could issue warrants at will and withhold evidence selectively, including the identity of
the detainee's accusers, thus by-passing the right of a defendant to confront and cross-examine his
accusers." Longaker, supra note 129, at 402; see also Prohibiting Detention Camps: Hearings on H.R.
234 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 40-81 (1971) [hereinafter
4001 Hearings] (collecting testimony on the perception of the EDA as a pernicious statutory regime).
139. See Note, supra note 13 1, at 651 n.427 (noting that the EDA leaves unresolved the question of
whether the president could unilaterally authorize and pursue such detentions).
140. But see Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., Freedom and Internal Security, 64 HARV. L. REv. 383, 410
(1951) (characterizing the EDA as a restraint); Note, supra note 132, at 659 (same).
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analysis becomes readily apparent. Steel Seizure, or at least Justice Jackson's
concurring opinion in the case, "outlined the three now-canonical categories
that guide modem analysis of separation of powers."' 14 1 As Justice Jackson
wrote, "When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization
of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate."' 142 Jackson's
second category, the so-called "zone of twilight," set forth the argument that
congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a
practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential
responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract
theories of law.
1 43
Finally, Jackson's third category, and the one of particular relevance here, dealt
with presidential actions "incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress, [where] his power is at its lowest ebb." 144 As Jackson concluded,
"then [the President] can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus
any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain
exclusive Presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress
from acting upon the subject., 145
B. Abner Mikva's "Little Statute" and the Repeal of the EDA
With Justice Jackson's pronouncements in Steel Seizure in mind, the 1971
repeal of the EDA becomes all the more crucial to an understanding of the
source of the detention power. Indeed, though no U.S. citizen was ever
detained under the auspices of the EDA, 14 6 the Act was viewed as "an
instrumentality for apprehending and detaining citizens who hold unpopular
beliefs and views.' ' 14 7 Further, and perhaps most poignantly, "groups of
Japanese-American citizens regard[ed] the legislation as permitting a
recurrence of the round ups which resulted in the detention of Americans of
Japanese ancestry in 1941 and subsequently during World War II.,'
148
Former Judge Abner Mikva, a U.S. congressman in 1971, summarized the
141. Katyal & Tribe, supra note 78, at 1274. On the background of the case and the substance of
the other opinions, see MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF
PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1977).
142. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 637. To support this proposition, Justice Jackson cited Merryman, Milligan, Bollman,
and the debate over the authority to properly suspend the writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 637 n.3; see also
supra text accompanying note 57.
144. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 637.
145. Id.at637-38.
146. No one was ever detained under the Act because no U.S. president declared an "internal
security emergency" at any point during its twenty-one-year existence. See H.R. REP. No. 92-116, at 2
(1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1435, 1436.
147. Id., reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1436.
148. Id., reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1436.
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background of the repeal of the EDA in a speech before the Chicago Lawyer
Chapter of the American Constitution Society on June 15, 2003. As Mikva
noted, his "little statute"
came about as a result of a 1970 visit I had made to Hyde Park High School, then a
part of my congressional district.... [O]ne of the students asked me what I was
going to do about the detention camps where they were going to send all the black
kids in case of riots. I assured him that there were no such camps, and he showed
me a picture of one .... The camps had [indeed] been authorized, and property was
acquired, but camps were never opened. It also turned out that the Japanese
American Citizens League, sensitive to what had happened in World War II, had
been trying to get [the EDA] repealed. Each session, Congressman Matsunaga had
put in a bill to repeal it, which was duly sent to the House Un-American Activities
Committee where it didn't even get a decent burial. One of my bright staffers
suggested that instead of repealing the Emergency Detention Law, we put in a new
provision in the criminal code, which said that "no citizen should be imprisoned or
otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress."
When I asked the parliamentarian where such a bill would get assigned, he smiled
broadly, and said that it would go to the Judiciary Committee-of which I was a
member. 149
The rest was history. In its report accompanying the Matsunaga-Mikva bill,
the Ninety-Second Congress's House Judiciary Committee also concluded that
the EDA, if ever used, "would seem to violate the Fifth Amendment by
providing imprisonment not as a penalty for the commission of an offense, but
on mere suspicion that an offense may occur in the future."' 50 Yet, the
Committee did not stop there. In the seminal passage, the Report concluded:
[lI]t is not enough merely to repeal the Detention Act.... Repeal alone might leave
citizens subject to arbitrary executive detention, with no clear demarcation of the
limits of executive authority. It has been suggested that repeal alone would leave us
where we were prior to 1950. The Committee believes that imprisonment or other
detention of citizens should be limited to situations in which a statutory
authorization, an Act of Congress, exists. This will assure that no detention camps
can be established without at least the acquiescence of the Congress.' 5'
Thus, in addition to repealing the Emergency Detention Act, the 1971 Act,
an Act "[t]o amend title 18, United States Code, to prohibit the establishment
of detention camps, and for other purposes,"' 52 also created, as per Mikva's
149. Abner J. Mikva, The Department of Injustice: John Ashcroft and His Rough Riders, Remarks
to the American Constitution Society, Chicago Lawyers Chapter 2-3 (June 15, 2003), available at
http://www.acslaw.org/pdf/mikvaspeech.pdf; see also 4001 Hearings, supra note 138, at 42-43
(testimony of Rep. Mikva) (describing the origins of the Act); Longaker, supra note 129, at 400-07
(surveying the political background leading up to the repeal of the EDA).
150. H.R. REP. No. 92-116, at 4, reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1438.
151. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1438 (emphasis added). Originally, the proposed
bill required that all detentions be pursuant to the "incarceration" provisions of Title 18, the criminal
code. The language was changed to any "Act of Congress" only after the government objected that
provisions elsewhere in the U.S. Code-including in Title 10, the laws pertaining to the military-
authorized the detention of citizens. See 4001 Hearings, supra note 138, at 72-80; see also Wuerth,
supra note 45 (manuscript at 29 n.133). Thus, not only can there be no doubt that § 4001 applies to
military detention as well, but it is also clear that Congress only had specific authorizations in mind.
152. Act of Sept. 25, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-128, 85 Stat. 347.
Yale Law & Policy Review
plan, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), which dictated that "[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned
or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of
Congress."' 53 The nature of the required authorization, implicit in the statute,
was clear from the legislative history and the background-Congress had to
affirmatively authorize the extra-judicial detention of U.S. citizens. As Richard
Longaker put it:
Although there is no bar to Congress authorizing detention in the future, the
legislative purpose is quite clear: Congress did not want to reserve detention for
itself, it wanted to do away with it.... Congress was preparing only for the
unthinkable when it preempted the field. 1
54
Any analysis of the scope or the extent of the application of § 4001(a) is
significantly informed by Howe v. Smith,155 in which the Supreme Court
affirmed an expansive reading of the provision as "proscribing detention of any
kind by the United States, absent a congressional grant of authority to
detain." 156 Thus, in Howe, the only case to date to bring it before the Supreme
Court (albeit in a very different context), § 4001 (a) was read expansively to
apply to all federal detentions of U.S. citizens, and, as importantly, to require a
congressional grant of authority, a clear legislative authorization, for the
detention. After Howe, U.S. citizens are either detained under a congressional
grant of authority, or they are detained illegally. Howe, a case completely
forgotten about prior to September 11, further reaffirms the understanding of
the President's power to detain as not deriving from the Constitution, but from
Congress. Otherwise, § 4001(a) would have raised significant constitutional
questions, a claim pursued neither in Howe nor in any of the instant cases.
C. The Detention Power Before September 11
In sum, prior to September 11, if the executive sought to detain U.S.
citizens as anything other than prisoners of war (and, indeed, quite possibly as
POWs as well), such detention required unambiguous congressional
authorization. Under Brown, no declaration of war or other authorization for
military action could implicitly authorize such; under Bollman and Merryman,
the executive lacked the independent power to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus (though the Militia Act probably delegated such authority in areas under
martial law); and, perhaps most importantly, under Quirin, the power to detain
and try "enemy combatants," whatever they may be, was held as deriving from
Congress's constitutional authority, belonging to the executive only to the
extent to which he took care to ensure that the laws were faithfully executed-
153. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000). As was noted immediately after its passage, § 4001(a) would not
interfere with the Suspension Clause since only Congress could suspend the writ. See Developments in
the Law-The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1130, 1313-17 (1972).
154. Longaker, supra note 129, at 406
155. 452 U.S. 473 (1981).
156. Id. at 479 n.3. Fora more detailed discussion, see Viadeck, supra note 10, at 962-63.
Vol. 22:153, 2004
The Detention Power
the President could only act pursuant to preexisting legislative authorization.
Prior to September 11, the power to detain was clearly the province of the
legislature, a power over which Congress had dramatically and forcefully
reasserted its domain in 1971. The law was clear and the precedents
unambiguous.
IV. THE DETENTION POWER AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
A. Yasser Esam Hamdi, Jose Padilla, and U.S. Citizen "Enemy Combatants"
A few months after September 11, Yasser Esam Hamdi, a Louisiana-born
U.S. citizen, was picked up by the Northern Alliance somewhere in
Afghanistan. Allegedly carrying an AK-47 assault rifle at the time of his
capture, Hamdi was subsequently turned over to U.S. authorities, who
transferred him to Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba, the holding place for non-citizen
"enemy combatants," in January 2002. Between January and April, the
government determined that Hamdi was indeed a U.S. citizen, and transferred
him stateside to a Navy brig, where he has remained ever since.157 Hamdi filed
a habeas petition in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
on June 11, 2002 ,158 a petition that was formally dismissed by the Fourth
Circuit on January 8, 2003,159 after several rounds of interlocutory appeals.
1 60
On July 9, the court voted 8-4 to deny rehearing en banc.
161
On May 8, 2002, by which point Hamdi had been in U.S. custody for
nearly six months, Jose Padilla was arrested by the FBI on a material witness
warrant issued by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
as he got off a plane at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport. On May 15,
Padilla appeared before Southern District Chief Judge Michael B. Mukasey-
who had issued the material witness warrant-at which time he was appointed
counsel. Padilla again appeared in court one week later, where he moved to
vacate the material witness warrant. After briefs were submitted on June 7, the
question was set down for argument on June 11. On June 9, however, President
Bush signed an order declaring Padilla to be an "enemy combatant," at which
time he was transferred to military custody and moved to the floating Navy
Brig at Goose Creek, South Carolina, where he has remained since.
162
157. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi II1), 316 F.3d 450, 459-62 (4th Cir.), petition for cert.filed,
No. 03-6696 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2003).
158. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va.
2002) (No. 2:02cv439), http://news.findlaw.comIhdocs/docs/terrorism/hamdirums611O2pet.pdf.
159. HamdiIll, 316 F.3d450.
160. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi If), 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi
1), 294 F.3d 598 (4th Cir. 2002).
161. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi IV), 337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003).
162. For the factual background, see Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush (Padilla 1), 233 F. Supp. 2d
564, 569-73 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). See also Paula Span, Enemy Combatant Vanishes Into a "Legal Black
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On June 11, the previously scheduled date to argue the motion to vacate,
Donna Newman-Padilla's court-appointed counsel-filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus. 16 3 Judge Mukasey released an opinion and order on
December 4 finding that he did properly have jurisdiction over Padilla, that
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was a proper respondent, that the
detention was facially lawful, and that Padilla should have access to counsel in
order to fully adjudicate the remaining questions vis-A-vis the government's
basis for detaining him.' 64 On January 9, 2003, the day after the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Hamdi I1, the government filed a motion for
reconsideration of the ruling on Padilla's access to counsel. Judge Mukasey
granted the motion, but then adhered to his original opinion in an order issued
on March 11,165 and, on April 9, certified the case for interlocutory appeal to
the Second Circuit.
6 6
Though the two cases raise myriad and complex procedural and substantive
issues, the Southern District in Padilla I and the Fourth Circuit in Hamdi III
each made short work out of the requirements of § 4001(a) by invoking the
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) and 10 U.S.C. § 956(5), an
appropriations provision for military detention.
At the core of the Fourth Circuit's January 8 decision in Hamdi I1 was the
conclusion that "the Commander in Chief has constitutionally detained Hamdi
pursuant to the war powers entrusted to him by the United States
Constitution."' 67 After noting Quirin's general statement about the president's
powers under the Commander-in-Chief Clause, the opinion then concludes that
"[t]hese powers include the authority to detain those captured in armed
struggle,"'168 yet the only precedent the court cites to support that conclusion is
one of its own earlier decisions in Hamdi.1
69
This is a recurring theme in the January 8 opinion, which repeatedly cites
the Fourth Circuit's two earlier rulings in Hamdi, especially Hamdi II, as the
primary support for a number of its contentions. Indeed, the opinion cites only
one Supreme Court precedent, and a shaky one at that, to support the broad
judicial deference claim that underscores most of the court's argument, a claim
otherwise based entirely on Hamdi 1.170
Hole, " WASH. POST, July 30, 2003, at Al.
163. See Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Padilla I (No. 02-CIV-445),
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/padillabush6l9O2apet.pdf.
164. See Padillal, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564.
165. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld (Padilla 11), 243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
166. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld (Padilla 111), 256 F. Supp. 2d 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
167. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi 111), 316 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 2003),petition for cert.filed, No.
03-6696 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2003).
168. Id. at 463.
169. Id. (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi If), 296 F.3d 278, 281-82 (4th Cir. 2002)).
170. Hamdi III, 316 F.3d at 463 ("Thus the Supreme Court has lauded '[t]he operation of a healthy
deference to legislative and executive judgments in the area of military affairs."' (quoting Rostker v.
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After presenting the judicial deference argument, the court considered, and
summarily rejected, the § 4001(a) argument by concluding that both statutes
satisfied the 1971 provision's requirement.17' For the AUMF, the court noted
that "capturing and detaining enemy combatants is an inherent part of warfare;
the 'necessary and appropriate force' referenced in the congressional resolution
necessarily includes the capture and detention of any and all hostile forces
arrayed against our troops."'
172
In addition to the AUMF, the Fourth Circuit also concluded that 10 U.S.C.
§ 956(5), which authorizes the use of appropriated funds for "the maintenance,
pay, and allowances of prisoners of war [and] other persons in the custody of
the [military] whose status is determined ... to be similar to prisoners of
war,"] 73 also authorizes the detention. As the panel wrote, "[i]t is difficult if not
impossible to understand how Congress could make appropriations for the
detention of persons 'similar to prisoners of war' without also authorizing their
detention in the first instance."'
' 74
The court, however, was quick to highlight the difference between Hamdi
and Padilla, and the limited scope of its holding in the former:
We have no occasion.., to address the designation as an enemy combatant of an
American citizen captured on American soil or the role that counsel might play in
such a proceeding. We shall, in fact, go no further in this case than the specific
context before us-that of the undisputed detention of a citizen during a combat
operation undertaken in a foreign country and a determination by the executive that
the citizen was allied with enemy forces.
75
In their opinions concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc in Hamdi IV,
Judges Traxler and Wilkinson only reaffirmed the above argument. As Judge
Wilkinson wrote, "[t]o compare this battlefield capture to the domestic arrest in
Padilla v. Bush is to compare apples and oranges.'
76
The four opinions concurring and dissenting from the Fourth Circuit's
denial of rehearing en banc only further suggest the extent to which the
underlying authority for the detentions was not a significant issue for the
Hamdi court. Instead, the opinions focused on whether Hamdi's capture was
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 66 (1981))). Rosiker only took notice of other cases showing deference tojoint
decisions of the executive and the legislature, and the "military affairs" at issue were purely the
government's authority over its own armed forces. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 66-67.
171. Hamdill1, 316 F.3d at 467-68.
172. Id. at 467.
173. 10 U.S.C. § 956(5) (2000).
174. Hamdi 111, 316 F.3d at 467-68.
175. Id. at 465 (citation omitted).
176. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi IV), 337 F.3d 335, 344 (4th Cir. 2003) (Wilkinson, J., concurring
in denial of rehearing en banc); see also id. at 352 (Traxler, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en
banc) ("Our decision .... addresses only the appropriate level of deference to be observed when the
President exercised his power to detain an American citizen found within the boundaries of Afghanistan
during our military efforts to overthrow its governing regime.").
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clearly "in the zone of active combat," or if that was even an open question,'
77
assuming that there was no question as to the President's underlying authority
to detain U.S. citizens captured on the battlefield.
Similarly, in Padilla, Judge Mukasey, unwilling to accept the argument
relied upon by the government in its briefs-that § 4001(a) does not apply to
enemy combatants such as Padilla 17-instead accepted the government's
weaker assertion, that, even applying § 4001(a), Padilla's detention was
authorized by statute, relying, as the Fourth Circuit had in Hamdi 111, on the
AUMF. 179 In the opinion's most critical passage, Judge Mukasey read the
AUMF to "authorize[] action against not only those connected to the subject
organizations who are directly responsible for the September 11 attacks, but
also against those who would engage in 'future acts of international terrorism'
as part of 'such.. . organizations. -180 Like the Fourth Circuit judges
concurring and dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc in Hamdi IV,
Mukasey was not subsequently confronted with the underlying authority for
Padilla's detention. Instead, on reconsideration, the questions focused entirely
on Padilla's access to counsel.181
Thus, the Fourth Circuit, with very little rigorous analysis, affirmed the
underlying legality of Hamdi's detention by passing reference to both statutes
proffered by the government for just such a purpose. Similarly, the Southern
District, though conducting a slightly more thorough examination of the
statutes themselves, still found sufficient authorization in one-the AUMF. A
closer look at both statutes, however, along with the arguments invoking them,
proves both courts distressingly wrong.
B. Statutory Authorization, Part I.- The Authorization for Use of Military Force
The AUMF was passed on September 18, 2001, just one week after the
September 11 attacks.' 82 In vague terms, it authorized the President:
177. See generally Hamdi IV, 337 F.3d at 341-45 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in the denial of
rehearing en bane); id. at 345-57 (Traxler, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 357-
68 (Luttig, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane); id. at 368-76 (Motz, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en bane).
178. See Respondents' Reply in Support of Motion To Dismiss the Amended Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus at 18, 24-27, Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(No. 02-CIV-445), http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorism/padillabushl01102grply.pdf (arguing
that § 4001(a) cannot impinge on the president's constitutional authority to detain enemy combatants
during wartime).
179. See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 598 ("Although the government struggles unsuccessfully to
avoid application of the statute, the government is on firmer ground when it argues that even if
§ 4001 (a) applies, its terms have been complied with.").
180. Id. at 598-99 (citations omitted). Mukasey did not consider the § 956(5) argument, but he did
not need to. Following from his discussion of the AUMF, Congress had authorized Padilla's detention,
and § 4001(a) was satisfied.
181. See Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
182. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1541 note (West 2003)).
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[T]o use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks
that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in
order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States
by such nations, organizations, or persons.183
Despite the quick turnaround between the attacks and the AUMF, and
although the language of the AUMF, as passed, was somewhat ambiguous, it
was far less of a carte blanche than what the Bush Administration had
originally asked for, since the Senate removed from the final version of the Act
the phrase "and to deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism or aggression
against the United States," which originally came between "September 11,
2001" and "or harbored."1 84 Further, as the text plainly shows, the AUMF said
nothing about the detention of anyone in connection with the use of military
force, let alone the detention of U.S. citizens, such as Padilla, arrested stateside
by civilian authorities. Additionally, there is the semantic argument-that "the
language of the Authorization suggests that it applies to future acts only to the
extent that the capture of those responsible for the September 11 th attacks
would prevent future attacks by those persons.' 85 Thus, if § 4001(a) requires
an unambiguous congressional grant of authority to detain U.S. citizens, it is
hard-if not impossible-to see how the AUMF is such a legislative measure.
Second, even if § 4001(a) could be satisfied by implicit congressional
authorization, there is Brown v. United States, the Supreme Court's 1814
holding that congressional declarations of war are not, as a general matter,
independent legislative grants of substantive authority. 186 Under Brown, an
executive's power during a declared war is either inherent in the Constitution,
is delegated by a separate Act of Congress, or does not exist-it cannot come
from the declaration of war itself. Thus, it should only follow that use of force
authorizations, though not strictly "declarations of war," should be read with a
similar presumption, especially in light of Ex parte Endo.i8 7 Yet, as Parts I, II,
and III have clearly established, with one possible exception for prisoners of
war, no inherent executive power to detain U.S. citizens during wartime has
ever been sustained, let alone the detention of U.S. citizen "enemy
combatants," whatever that category of persons may actually be.
This is not to suggest that thie President may lawfully detain Hamdi and
183. Id. § 2(a).
184. See 147 CONG. REC. S9950-51 (daily ed., Oct. 1, 2001) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (providing
the text of the Administration's proposal); see also id. at S9949 ("[Tihe use of force authority granted to
the President extends only to the perpetrators of the September 11 attack. It was not the intent of
Congress to give the President unbridled authority... to wage war against terrorism writ large without
the advice and consent of Congress. That intent was made clear when Senators modified the text of the
resolution proposed by the White House to limit the grant of authority to the September 11 attack.").
185. Vladeck, supra note 10, at 967 n.40.
186. See supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text (discussing Brown).
187. See supra Section II.D (highlighting Endo's take on legislative authorization during wartime).
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Padilla as POWs on his own constitutional authority. Because of Territo,
however, this question is not as easily resolved as the question of whether he
can detain them on any other basis. If Hamdi actually was captured in the
"zone of active combat," and if he was fighting for the Taliban, then he
probably could be lawfully detained as a prisoner of war until the cessation of
hostilities, so long as the detention conformed to the provisions of the 1949
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.' 
88
This, however, is a far cry from the Fourth Circuit's assertion, in Hamdi III,
that "[t]here is no indication that § 4001(a) was intended to overrule the
longstanding rule that an armed and hostile American citizen captured on the
battlefield during wartime may be treated like the enemy combatant that he
is.', 8 9 As argued above, to whatever extent such a "longstanding rule" exists, it
derives from Quirin, it does not inherently authorize indefinite detention
without trial, and it still requires legislative authorization, which is clearly
lacking here. Further, the category "enemy combatant" has, except for Quirin
and two other World War II-era cases, no history.' The argument that
"capturing and detaining enemy combatants is an inherent part of warfare"
distorts the truth. Capturing and detaining belligerents is, and always has been,
an inherent part of warfare. However, even during the Second World War,
when the precedents on which the Fourth Circuit's decision relied were created,
belligerents were lawful, in which case they were detained as prisoners of war,
or unlawful, and thus subject to mandatory trial by congressionally authorized
military commissions for crimes proscribed by Congress. "There was no
middle ground for 'enemy combatants' to be held indefinitely without a
judicial remedy."' 9 1
188. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter 1949 Geneva Convention]; see also supra note 101
(discussing the POW distinction). Detaining Padilla as a POW would raise a separate range of issues,
since he was most decidedly not captured in a "zone of active combat," since he was initially arrested by
the FBI, and since he was not actively fighting against the United States at the time of his capture. Cf
NIGEL S. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1999)
(surveying the legal requirements of the treatment of all prisoners-military and otherwise-under
international law).
189. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi 111), 316 F.3d 450, 468 (4th Cir. 2003)petition for cert. filed, No.
03-6696 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2003).
190. See ROBERT K. GOLDMAN & BRIAN D. TITTEMORE, AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L., UNPRIVILEGED
COMBATANTS AND THE HOSTILITIES IN AFGHANISTAN: THEIR STATUS AND RIGHTS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2002), http://www.asil.org/
taskforce/goldman.pdf; see also Richard R. Baxter, So-Called 'Unprivileged Belligerency': Spies,
Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 323 (1951).
191. Vladeck, supra note 10, at 967; see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942); GOLDMAN &
TITTEMORE, supra note 190, at 23-39 (discussing the historical distinction between lawful and unlawful
combatants in international law). But see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi IV), 337 F.3d 335, 341 n.1 (4th
Cir. 2003) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) ("The government does not
concede that Hamdi is a prisoner of war, but rather asserts that he is an unlawful combatant. For
purposes of the present case, the distinction is irrelevant because the decision to detain until the end of
hostilities belongs to the executive in either case.").
True, the decision to detain belongs to the executive, but not if there is no underlying authority-no
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Because neither Padilla nor Hamdi are detained as POWs, the AUMF
cannot, as a matter of law under Brown, independently authorize their
detentions. Thus, the AUMF does not satisfy § 4001(a).
C. Statutory Authorization, Part II. 10 U.S.C. § 956(5)
Of course, both Brown and § 4001(a) are still satisfied if authorization for
the detentions of Hamdi and Padilla can be found in 10 U.S.C. § 956(5), the
other statute invoked by the government as authorizing the detentions.
Inasmuch as the case for the AUMF satisfying § 4001(a) fails to persuade,
however, the arguments in support of 10 U.S.C. § 956(5) are completely
irreconcilable with both a long-accepted canon of statutory interpretation and
with the provision's history itself.
As to the statutory interpretation, to read 10 U.S.C. § 956(5) the way the
Fourth Circuit suggests would lead to an absurd result, since it would
effectively overrule 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) and its requirement of an explicit
grant of authority, yet no mention of § 4001(a) is made in the Act enacting 10
U.S.C. § 956,192 nor in the legislative history accompanying it.' 93 Since repeals
by implication are generally disfavored, 194 and "the policy applies with even
greater force when the claimed repeal rests solely on an Appropriations
Act,"' 95 it is dubious at best to read 10 U.S.C. § 956(5), which, in its plain
language, merely appropriates funds for the detention of POWs and persons
similar to such, and which does not explicitly authorize the detention of
anyone, as implicitly authorizing the detention of U.S. citizens in satisfaction of
the auspices of § 4001(a). 196
Yet, it is the history of § 956(5) that provides an even more forceful
argument for why the provision could never satisfy § 4001(a). The government,
power thereto. Further, under Article 5 of the 1949 Geneva Convention, Hamdi cannot be detained as
anything but a POW unless his status has been so determined by a "competent tribunal." See 1949
Geneva Convention, art. 5, 75 U.N.T.S. at 140, 142; see also Laura A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process
to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75
S. CAL. L. REV. 1407, 1409 n.6 (2002); Melysa H. Sperber, Note, John Walker Lindh and Yaser Esam
Hamdi: Closing the Loophole in International Humanitarian Law for American Nationals Captured
Abroad While Fighting With Enemy Forces, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 159, 164 n.28 (2003). No such
determination has been made here; thus, to put it as simply as possible, either Hamdi is detained as a
POW, with all the rights and privileges appertaining thereto, or his detention is illegal.
192. Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-525, § 1401(b)(l), 98 Stat.
2492, 2614 (1984).
193. H.R. REP. No. 98-691 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4174.
194. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549 (1974).
195. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978).
196. As importantly, Congress has explicitly authorized the detention of persons who might be
"similar to prisoners of war" elsewhere in Title 10, specifically in Chapter 47, the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2000), which criminalizes a wide range of conduct both by U.S.
soldiers and by enemy belligerents, lawful or otherwise. Codified in Chapter 48 of Title 10, § 956
applies to "such military correctional facilities as are necessary for the confinement of offenders against
chapter 47 of this title." 10 U.S.C. § 951.
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in both Hamdi and Padilla, has argued that § 956(5) was codified in 1984, and
should thus be read with the presumption that Congress knew about § 4001(a)
when it passed the provision. Indeed, the language in 10 U.S.C. § 956(5)
appropriating funds for "expenses incident to the maintenance, pay, and
allowances of prisoners of war, other persons in the custody of the Army,
Navy, or Air Force whose status is determined... to be similar to prisoners of
war, and persons detained in the custody of the Army, Navy, or Air Force
pursuant to Presidential proclamation"'197 was codified by the Department of
Defense Authorization Act of 1985.198 However, similar language had been
included in the annual Defense Department appropriations act every year,
dating back well before the 1971 enactment of § 4001(a), all the way to the
Second World War.
199
Specifically, most of the language in § 956(5), including that authorizing
the use of funds for "persons detained. . . pursuant to Presidential
proclamation" was first codified in an emergency supplemental appropriations
act passed by the Seventy-Seventh Congress on December 17, 1941, just ten
days after Pearl Harbor. The Act, which supplemented the 1942 Military
Appropriation Act,2°° authorized the Secretary of War
[T]o utilize any appropriation available for the Military Establishment, under such
regulations as he may prescribe, for all expenses incident to the maintenance, pay,
and allowances of prisoners of war, other persons in Army custody whose status is
determined.., to be similar to prisoners of war, and persons detained in Army
custody pursuant to Presidential proclamation.
20 1
Such appropriations were necessary because, just five days earlier,
President Roosevelt had issued Executive Order 8972, in which he
"authorize[d] and direct[ed] the Secretar[ies] of War [and the Navy] ... to
establish and maintain military guards and patrols, and to take other appropriate
measures, to protect from injury or destruction national-defense material,
national-defense premises, and national-defense utilities."
20 2
The December 12 Executive Order was superseded, two months later, by
the now-infamous Executive Order 9066, which authorized the creation of
"military areas" from which "any or all persons may be excluded, and with
respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be
197. 10 U.S.C. § 956(5).
198. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
199. See, e.g., Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-114, § 706, 95 Stat.
1565, 1578 (1981); Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-204, § 705, 85 Stat.
716, 727 (1971); Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1963, Pub. L. No. 87-577, § 504, 76 Stat.
318, 328 (1962); Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1954, ch. 305, § 610, 67 Stat. 336, 350
(1953); Military Appropriation Act, 1945, ch. 303, § 15, 58 Stat. 573, 595-96 (1944). Similar provisions
can be found in each year's Act. For brevity's sake, I have here only included a range.
200. Military Appropriation Act, 1942, ch. 262, 55 Stat. 66 (1941).
201. Third Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1942, ch. 591, tit. Ill, § 103, 55 Stat.
810, 813-14 (1941).
202. Exec. Order No. 8972, 6 Fed. Reg. 6420 (Dec. 12, 1941).
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subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military
Commander may impose in his discretion." 20 3 Executive Order 9066, which
was ratified by Congress on March 21, 1942,204 became the basis for the
Japanese-American internment camps. 205 Though a number of Japanese
Americans were convicted for violating exclusion orders, a measure that the
1942 Act criminalized, most were detained under the orders themselves, 20 6 and
were thus "persons detained in Army custody pursuant to Presidential
proclamation," funds for which were available under the December 17 Act, the
predecessor to § 956(5).
It is unlikely-and nothing in the Congressional Record supports the
notion-that this provision was enacted with internment in mind. Nevertheless,
it is certainly ironic that the provision that was eventually used to appropriate
funds for the detention of Japanese-American internees during World War II is
today being cited as satisfying § 4001(a), a statute passed to explicitly
repudiate the internment camps and to require unambiguous congressional
authorization for the detention of all U.S. citizens. 207 If anything, the history of
§ 956(5) is written in the very tears § 4001(a) was meant to wipe away.
To argue that § 956(5) authorizes the detention of U.S. citizens as enemy
combatants is thus not only to argue that it authorizes the detention of anyone
detained pursuant to a presidential proclamation, but also to argue that it
rendered § 4001(a) moot, ab initio, for it is a contention that Congress, in
enacting § 956(5)-and in codifying it in 1984-delegated its entire detention
authority to the President. If this is not an absurd result, what is? If § 956(5)
does authorize the detention of U.S. citizens as "enemy combatants," as the
Fourth Circuit plainly held it does, 20 8 then the slope for others who might be
detained is not just slippery; it is downright vertical.
Thus, no compelling argument exists that either the AUMF or 10 U.S.C.
203. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
204. Act of Mar. 21, 1942, ch. 191, 56 Stat. 173 (repealed 1948).
205. See Grossman, supra note 120, at 651-52.
206. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81 (1943); see also Gudridge, supra note 122, at 1947 & n.73 (discussing the distinction between
the exclusion cases and Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944), and citing the numbers of persons believed
to fit under either scheme).
207. See supra notes 146-156 and accompanying text (discussing the background of § 4001 (a) and
the importance of repudiating the internment camps).
208. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi Ill), 316 F.3d 450, 467-68 (4th Cir. 2003). It is no small wonder,
based on the Fourth Circuit's summary disposition of this critical question, that Judge Motz was so
critical in her dissent from the denial of rehearing en bane:
I fear that the panel may also have opened the door to the indefinite detention, without access
to a lawyer or the courts, of any ... citizen, even one captured on American soil, who the
Executive designates an "enemy combatant," as long as the Executive asserts that the area in
which the citizen was detained was an "active combat zone," and the detainee, deprived of
access to courts and counsel, cannot dispute this fact.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi IV), 337 F.3d 335, 373 n.5 (4th Cir. 2003) (Motz, J., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en bane). Indeed, the holding is even broader than what Judge Motz portrays.
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§ 956(5) satisfy the requirements of § 4001(a). Even if § 4001(a) does not
require explicit congressional authorization (which the legislative history seems
to suggest it does), neither statute serves to implicitly authorize the detentions
either. Hamdi and Padilla are both detained in violation of § 4001(a), and all of
the secondary questions that the courts have thus far been preoccupied with-
e.g., where Hamdi was captured; whether his next friend should have standing;
whether Padilla should have access to counsel; whether the Southern District
should have jurisdiction over his habeas petition; and so on-should never
have been reached in the first place. This is not to suggest that these issues are
unimportant or easily resolved; 20 9 rather, though this Note has focused much
more on the baseline legality of the detentions than on the due process afforded
to the detainees, I have not meant to imply that the latter is any less important
than the former. Certainly, if Congress had authorized the detentions of Hamdi
and Padilla, the inquiry would not end there, but would rather turn to the
process by which they, as U.S. citizens, were designated "enemy combatants,"
and the availability of judicial review to challenge that determination. Because
Congress has not so acted, however, these questions need not be reached.
E. On the Importance of Congress
Congressional authorization, of course, is not all that is necessary for the
detention of U.S. citizens-such authorization must comport with the various
protections afforded by the Constitution, whether explicitly or by
210construction. Still, as Alexander Bickel argues, "Singly, either the President
or Congress can fall into bad errors .... So they can together too, but that is
somewhat less likely, and in any event, together they are all we've got."
211
That Congress has demonstrated a willingness to grant broad authority to
the executive branch to fight the "war on terror" is self-evident from a host of
post-September 11 enactments, the most wide-ranging of which is, of course,
209. Many of the other pieces discussing Hamdi and Padilla thus far have indeed focused on
several of these questions. See sources cited supra note 10.
210. The Supreme Court has, in recent years, consistently been confronted with the due process
constraints on non-criminal confinement in a series of cases arising out of the Kansas Sexually Violent
Predator Act. See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); see
also In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285 (Kan. 2000). For an overview of the background of the cases, the decisions
in both, and the due process calculus employed by the court, see Peter C. Pfaffenroth, The Need for
Coherence: States' Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 STAN. L.
REv. 2229 (2003). Even in the immigration context, the Court has repeatedly encountered-and
attempted to prescribe-the due process limits on indefinite detention pending deportation. Compare
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), with Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). For additional
jurisprudence on the due process limits of other forms of non-criminal detention, see Foucha v.
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987); and Jones v. United
States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
211. War Powers, Libya, and State Sponsored Terrorism: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Arms
Control, International Security, and Science of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong. 88
(1986), quoted in ELY, supra note 86, at 9 & 147 n.47.
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the USA PATRIOT Act. USA PATRIOT, the source of significant criticism
from civil libertarians, is itself instructive, for it authorizes the executive
branch to detain aliens suspected of terrorist ties for up to seven days without
charges, 212 with no similar provision for U.S. citizens. An earlier statute had
already made it a crime to provide material support to terrorist organizations,
213
a charge the government has used against a number of other terrorism suspects
in the aftermath of September 11.214 Additionally, the government has detained
a number of individuals under a robust reading of the material witness statute,
18 U.S.C. § 3144, that was recently sustained by the Second Circuit, 21 5 and that
is an explicit congressional authorization in any event. Other congressional
action in the aftermath of September 11 only further underscores the role
Congress has thus far played in the "war on terror."
216
Indeed, it is not as if Congress has been reluctant to arm the executive with
a host of weapons to fight the "war." If anything, it has been too suppliant,
deferring to the executive's insistence that such powers are necessary to
217prevent future attacks. This belies the larger point, however, that Congress,
in the aftermath of September 11, has not shown the least reluctance to play its
constitutional role; certainly, it is not the case that the executive branch is here
confronted with a hostile or indifferent legislature refusing to act. If the
executive seeks authority to detain U.S. citizen "enemy combatants" as part of
the war on terror, Congress must first independently act to authorize such.
2 18
212. See supra note 11 (outlining USA PATRIOT's detention provisions).
213. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 303(a),
110 Stat. 1214, 1250 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000)).
214. For an overview of these cases, see Cole, supra note 17, at 8-15.
215. United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003). In Awadallah, the Second Circuit
resolved a conflict between different district judges in the Southern District on the viability of prolonged
detentions under the statute. Compare id., with United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (Schiendlin, J.), and In re Application of United States for a Material Witness Warrant,
213 F. Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (Mukasey, C.J.). For a useful analysis of the underlying legal
issues, see Laurie L. Levenson, Detention, Material Witnesses & The War on Terrorism, 35 LOY. L.A.
L. REv. 1217 (2002).
216. See, e.g., Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001)
(codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 note (West 2003)); Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (same); see also 2001 Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Pub. L.
No. 107-38, 115 Stat. 220.
217. This is hardly a new problem. See ELY, supra note 86, at ix ("[D]ecisions [to go to war] have
been made throughout the Cold War period by the executive, without significant congressional
participation (or judicial willingness to insist on such participation). It is common to style this shift a
usurpation, but that oversimplifies to the point of misstatement. It's true our Cold War presidents
generally wanted it that way, but Congress (and the courts) ceded the ground without a fight.... [T]he
legislative surrender was a self-interested one: Accountability is pretty frightening stuff."); see also
Editorial, The Moussaoui Law, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2003, at A14 ("Congress has sat on the sidelines
far too long as important decisions were made concerning the legal response to 9/11 .").
218. One example of what such authorization might look like is the Detention of Enemy
Combatants Act, H.R. 1029, 108th Cong. (2003). Originally introduced in the 107th Congress by
California Congressman Adam Schiff, the bill would authorize the detention of U.S. citizen "enemy
combatants" in the war on terror under certain, prescribed conditions, and with a whole host of
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Especially in the current climate, it is not a major political obstacle, but it is a
constitutionally mandated one.
CONCLUSION: THE ROLE OF COURTS IN THE "WAR ON TERROR"
Much has been made, in the three decades since the end of the Vietnam
War, of the extent to which that conflict altered the constitutional relationship
between legislative and presidential war power, or, at the very least,
highlighted a shift that had already begun to take place.219 Yet, as much as
Vietnam crystallized the debate over the separation of war-making powers
between the executive and Congress, it also saw a reaffirmation of the
separation of detention powers between the two branches. It is no coincidence
that the present incarnation of 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) was enacted in the midst of
the conflict in Southeast Asia, for it was undoubtedly meant to apply as broadly
and forcefully in wartime as in peacetime.
220
A number of scholars have challenged various Administration policies and
initiatives in the aftermath of September 11 on the grounds that the "war
against terror" is not a war, for constitutional purposes, or, at the very least, it is
not a war that invokes the war powers allocated to the president by the
Constitution. 1 In the detention realm, however, such a distinction is wholly
unnecessary. Though the Constitution may not be what Justice Davis described
in Milligan as "a law for rulers and people, equally in war and peace,' 222 it is
clear beyond any doubt that § 4001(a) is, especially when the 1971 enactment
is properly understood as Congress's reclamation and reassertion of a power it
alone possessed dating back to the Founding.
Assessing and asserting the force and vitality of § 4001 (a), however, is only
procedural safeguards-including legislative oversight. The bill makes explicit reference to § 400 1(a)
and Howe v. Smith, id. § 2(11), and guarantees the right to counsel in habeas petitions filed to contest
the legality of a detention. Id. § 2(14)-(15). As Representative Schiff noted in introducing the bill,
Congress has yet to authorize the detention of citizens in the war on terrorism, yet American
citizens have in fact been detained as enemy combatants. For this reason, [Congressman]
Frank and I are introducing the Detention of Enemy Combatants Act,.... [which] will
provide for clear standards and procedures under which American citizens or lawful residents
believed to be members of al Qaeda or its supporters may be detained as enemy combatants
while also provided due process.
149 CONG. REc. E324 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2003) (statement of Rep. Schiff). Though passage seems
unlikely, the bill is an important statement in and of itself-"Congress knows how to authorize the
detention of U.S. citizen enemy combatants, if it so desires." Vladeck, supra note 10, at 968.
219. See ELY, supra note 86; Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 185 (1995); see also Jane
E. Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional War Powers Today: Why Methodology Matters, 106 YALE
L.J. 845 (1996) (reviewing FISHER, supra).
220. See Longaker, supra note 129, at 408 ("Had there not been the use of abundant independent
presidential power in Vietnam there is real question whether Congress would have been so eager to
reassert its own authority [in repealing the EDA and enacting § 4001].").
221. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 4, at 346-50.
222. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120 (1866). On the problems with Justice Davis's oft-
cited elegy, see ROSSITER & LONGAKER, supra note 57, at 34-35.
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the beginning, for inasmuch as it may bar unilateral executive action, such a
bar is completely meaningless absent judicial enforcement. Here, we run
headlong into what Professor Harold Koh has called "the problem of judicial
tolerance"-the fact that, especially since Vietnam, "[t]he president almost
always seems to win in foreign affairs" because the courts have tended to defer
to the political branches when it comes to questions of war and national
security. 223 But why should this matter in the detention realm, where the
foreign affairs power is nowhere implicated, and where the traditional source of
the authority is Congress, and not the President?
Indeed, this is the enigma of the detention of "enemy combatants" after
September 11 -the fact that the statutes and the judicial precedents are entirely
on one side, the government is entirely on the other, and the courts are stuck
squarely in the middle, attracted by precedent, yet swayed just as much by
politics. This is also the reason why the detention of just two people in the
aftermath of September 11 represents such a fundamental apex in the role of
the judiciary in the "war on terror" and in the ever-ongoing debate over the
proper separation of powers. Both the Fourth Circuit's opinions in Hamdi III
(as well as the concurrences in Hamdi IV) and the Southern District's opinion
in Padilla can be read as manifestations, at their core, of this "problem of
judicial tolerance." Judge Wilkinson's opinion for the Fourth Circuit is replete
with references to-and, indeed, is largely based on the idea of-the "proper"
deference owed to the executive in times of conflict, especially with regard to
the questionable decision to characterize Hamdi as an "enemy combatant."
224
Judge Mukasey's opinion in Padilla, which otherwise rejects many of the
government's less significant arguments, defers, in its most critical passage, to
the interpretation of the AUMF favored by the Administration, despite
evidence in the legislative history that Congress explicitly meant to foreclose
such a reading.
Yet, this is not just what Professor Koh called the "problem of judicial
tolerance," for tolerance implicitly (and, for Professor Koh, explicitly) suggests
passivity. Instead, these decisions are better characterized as highlighting the
problem of judicial abdication, for in deferring to what is essentially unilateral
223. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER
THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 148 (1990); see also REHNQUIST, supra note 49, at 221 ("[Tlhere is also the
reluctance of courts to decide a case against the government on an issue of national security during a
war."); Harold Hongju Koh, Judicial Constraints: The Courts and the War Powers, in THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION AND THE POWER To GO TO WAR: HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVES 121 (Gary
M. Stem & Morton H. Halperin eds., 1994).
224. This is a major problem with Hamdi III and Hamdi IV-the extent to which both the panel
opinion in the former and the concurring opinions in the latter repeatedly invoke the need for deference,
and yet still reach dubious resolutions on the merits. The Washington Post put it best: "Some circles
can't be squared, and the courts must at some point choose between deference to the president's war
powers and protecting the liberty of Americans. Here's hoping the Supreme Court makes a better
choice." Editorial, Dissent on Detention, WASH. POST, July 20, 2003, at B6.
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executive action, the judiciary is failing to serve its most fundamental
constitutional purpose as a check on such power. As Justice Black opened his
dissent in Johnson v. Eisentrager, "[n]ot only is United States citizenship a
'high privilege,' it is a priceless treasure.... This ideal gave birth to the
constitutional provision for an independent judiciary with authority to check
abuses of executive power and to issue writs of habeas corpus liberating
persons illegally imprisoned.,
225
The danger, as Justice Jackson so presciently warned in Korematsu, is
judicial validation of a policy that is otherwise constitutionally repugnant. 226
That is the danger here.227 It is slightly more complicated in the case of Yasser
Esam Hamdi, but at least insofar as Jose Padilla is concerned, the detention of a
U.S. citizen, arrested by domestic authorities within the United States without
charge, transferred from civilian to military custody (where he has since been
indefinitely confined without access to counsel) solely on the basis of a
presidential determination which the government argues is not subject to
judicial review, when no statute of Congress has authorized such unilateral
executive action, is as deeply chilling to the rights conferred on all U.S. citizens
by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as any case to come before
the federal judiciary in our generation, if not ever.228
Those who support the government's position argue that such actions are
necessary in order to successfully prosecute the "war on terror" and to prevent
future terrorist attacks like those of September 11. As Attorney General John
Ashcroft told the Senate Judiciary Committee in December of 2001, "to those
who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message is
this: Your tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode our national unity and
diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to America's enemies, and pause
to America's friends." 229 I think that is backwards. It is the sacrifice of
freedoms in the name of security that gives pause to our friends-we need look
no further for evidence of this than the outrage that the Guantdnamo detentions
have caused in Great Britain, and the protests that have been leveled at Tony
Blair, easily our closest ally in the "war on terror."
230
225. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 791 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting).
226. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("[Olnce a
judicial opinion rationalizes [an executive action] to show that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather
rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an [action], the Court for all
time has validated the principle .. . [which] then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of
any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.").
227. Cf. Elbert Lin, Case Comment, Korematsu Continued..., 112 YALE L.J. 1911 (2003) (noting
the disturbing parallels between Korematsu and a case arising out of the post-September 11 removal of
passengers from commercial airline flights allegedly based solely on their race).
228. Indeed, perhaps only Dred Scott and the World War II internment cases have implicated
similarly fundamental liberty interests.
229. Anti-Terrorism Policy Review: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong., I st Sess., 2001 WL 26188084 (2001) (statement of Att'y Gen. John Ashcroft).
230. See, e.g., Nicholas Watt and Vikram Dodd, MPs 'Fury at Secret US Trials of 'Terror' Britons,
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The power to detain U.S. citizens is very much embedded within the
Constitution. The power to do so unilaterally, however, is not. The government
may have the authority to detain Hamdi and Padilla as "enemy combatants,"
but President Bush, acting on his own, simply doesn't. To date, the Fourth
Circuit has used the "zone of active combat" distinction as a means around the
otherwise unambiguous precedents; the Southern District of New York relied
on its interpretation of an ambiguous and vague congressional Resolution
authorizing the war in Afghanistan that certainly did not mean to authorize the
detention of U.S. citizens arrested in Chicago. Neither conclusion is
convincing, not just because the legal arguments are so overwhelmingly
contraindicated, but because the judiciary has an obligation, in such cases, to
check the power of a President acting outside the Constitution, and to restore
231the constitutional role Congress reclaimed for itself in enacting § 4001 (a).
There is nothing ideological or unduly melodramatic about such a concern
for the separation of powers in the present context. The voluminous precedents
read the same regardless of the reader; what really matters-and what this Note
hopes to ensure-is that they are read at all.
Ancient Right unnoticed as the breath we draw- 2
Leave to live by no man's leave, underneath the law.
GUARDIAN, July 8, 2003, at 2; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Foreword, On American Exceptionalism,
55 STAN. L. REV. 1479 (2003) (surveying the criticism of America for its abandonment of international
law and for its unilateralism); cf Cole, supra note 17 at 29 ("A little more than one year after the United
States suffered one of the worst attacks on civilian life in modem history, one might expect to find
widespread sympathy and support for the United States around the world. But instead, reports of anti-
Americanism suggest that hostility to the United States has grown substantially since September I I.").
Britain, especially, has a long history of dealing with terrorism, and boasts a sophisticated statutory
framework for detaining suspects. For a survey, see Rhiannon Talbot, The Balancing Act: Counter-
Terrorism and Civil Liberties in British Anti-Terrorism Law, in LAW AFTER GROUND ZERO, supra note
4, at 123. Cf SIMPSON, supra note 18; Cornelius P. Cotter, Emergency Detention in Wartime: The
British Experience, 6 STAN. L. REv. 238 (1954) (surveying detention in wartime England).
231. The warning of Chief Judge William Cranch, dissenting from the D.C. Circuit Court's
decision in United States v. Bollman, is very appropriate:
In times like these, when the public mind is agitated, when wars, and rumors of wars, plots,
conspiracies and treasons excite alarm, it is the duty of a court to be peculiarly watchful lest
the public feeling should reach the seat ofjustice, and thereby precedents be established which
may become the ready tools of faction in times more disastrous. The worst of precedents may
be established from the best of motives. We ought to be upon our guard lest our zeal for the
public interest lead us to overstep the bounds of the law and the constitution; for although we
may thereby bring one criminal to punishment, we may furnish the means by which a[]
hundred innocent persons may suffer. The constitution was made for times of commotion. In
the calm of peace and prosperity there is seldom great injustice. Dangerous precedents occur
in dangerous times. It then becomes the duty of the judiciary calmly to poise the scales of
justice, unmoved by the arm of power, undisturbed by the clamor of the multitude.
24 F. Cas. 1189, 1192 (C.C.D.D.C. 1807) (No. 14,622) (Cranch, C.J., dissenting); see also In re
McDonald, 16 F. Cas. 17, 19 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1861) (No. 8751) (borrowing the Bollman language to
justify the importance ofjudicial intervention in Missouri on the eve of the Civil War).
232. RUDYARD KIPLING, The Old Issue, in RUDYARD KIPLING'S VERSE 294, 295 (Doubleday,
Doran & Co. 1940); see also Hutchinson, supra note 127, at 483-84 & n.91 (reprinting Justice Jackson's
draft concurrence in Endo, which contained the couplet, and explaining its historical origins). Justice
Jackson invoked the passage again in his Steel Seizure concurrence on the limits of executive power. See
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).

